



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Workshop Report – Improving Cooperation  
in Operational Planning Among Interagency,  
Multinational, and Multilateral Partners**

A. Martin Lidy

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# **UNCLASSIFIED**

## **PREFACE**

This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in partial response to the task “Joint Interagency Experimentation Support” sponsored by the Joint Experimentation Directorate of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). This document serves as the summary record for the workshop co-sponsored by JFCOM and the U.S. Department of State from 7 to 9 October 2003. The workshop was designed and facilitated by IDA and the author wishes to thank the three working group chairmen and the rapporteurs and recorders for their assistance in accomplishing the objectives of the workshop and capturing the thoughts of the participants.

The document was reviewed by the Director of the Operational Evaluation Division, Mr. Robert R. Soule, and the working group chairmen, the rapporteurs, and recorders. The chairmen were Mr. William J. Olsen, Ambassador R. William Farrand (Ret.), and Ambassador Robert E. Gribbin (Ret.). The JFCOM rapporteurs were Mr. Gene Zajac, Mr. Steve Brown, and Mr. John Champagne. The recorders included Ms. Gloria Paris, Dr. L. Erik Kjonnerod, and Mr. Randy Cheek from the National Defense University’s Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review (ITEA) program. IDA recorders were Mr. William J. Shelby, MG David Baratto, USA (Ret.), and RADM Samuel H. Packer, USN (Ret.).



# WORKSHOP REPORT

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **A. OVERVIEW**

The workshop was cosponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the U.S. Department of State (DoS). It is one of several events in the U.S. Government's (USG) experimental development of emerging concepts for improving operational planning and coordination between civilian and military organizations when responding to regional crises. The workshop was conducted at the Department of State Foreign Service Institute's George Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) in Arlington, Virginia, from 7 to 9 October 2003. The participants in the workshop brought a wide range of experiences to the workshop and were eager to express their thoughts and provide suggestions. They are listed in Appendix A.

The concept for the workshop was developed and distributed to the invited participants along with a number of other related information papers and administrative instructions contained in Appendix B. This workshop was the first attempt to bring together knowledgeable civilian and military officials of the U.S. Government and selected multinational and multilateral partners who would likely be engaged in operational planning activities that typically occur when mounting an international intervention to address a complex emergency. It also provided the participants with the opportunity to learn firsthand the type of experimentation being conducted, and extended to them an invitation to participate in subsequent events.

### **B. WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES**

The workshop was designed to find opportunities for improving cooperation in operational planning for crisis intervention that involves multinational and multilateral partners working within the various coalitions to restore peace and stability in a troubled state. The results obtained from this workshop will inform the series of continuing organizational and operational experiments that JFCOM will conduct over the next year to refine the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) concept and implementation. The newly formed JIACG, located at the Regional Combatant Commands, will posture

itself to extend effective linkages to civilian agency officials who prepare operational plans for an intervention.

While recent international interventions such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Congo, or Iraq provided lessons that contributed to the development of this concept, an approach for improving cooperation among military and civilian operational planners should be applicable to other interagency planning efforts across the full spectrum of global security activities ranging from conducting peacetime engagement, countering terrorism, making war, or implementing peace.

The workshop first introduced the JIACG concept and the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE), and then, drawing on participant expertise, it:

- Examined how key civilian coalitions, both multinational and multilateral, organize themselves and perform operational planning for crisis response operations
- Clarified multinational and multilateral procedures used during precrisis operational planning
- Examined information-sharing practices planning
- Evaluated the role of education and training to better prepare prospective members
- Brainstormed options for improving cooperation in planning
- Solicited involvement in subsequent experimentation events.

### **C. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKSHOP AND REPORT**

The workshop was conducted over a 2-½ day period and included both plenary and working group breakout sessions. The workshop opened in a plenary session with selected briefings to establish a common understanding among participants. These briefings are provided in Appendix C. During the afternoon of the first day, the participants were formed into three working groups.

Former U.S. civilian officials with senior leadership and management experience served as the working group leaders and their biographies, along with other senior presenters, are contained in Appendix D. A rapporteur from JFCOM and two note takers – one from the National Defense University’s Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review (ITEA) program and one from IDA – assisted each working group chairman. Detailed intermediate objectives and deliverables were assigned for each working group session. The summaries of the key points made during the separate

working group discussions are provided without attribution in the three sections of the report. The wrap-up briefings presented during the final plenary session on the last day are included in Appendix E.

Each working group was given a unique scenario to facilitate the discussion of interagency, multinational, and multilateral collaboration and coordination. The scenarios were designed to address issues in a different geographic region and under a different set of circumstances that might occur during a complex emergency. The scenarios are summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1. Characteristics of the Scenarios Assigned to the Working Groups**

Working Group	Scenario	Intervention	Authority	Civilian Task	Civilian Coalition
1	Terrorist chemical/biological attack on major city in West Pacific	Disaster Relief and Consequence Management	Host Nation with UNSC Endorsement	Plan for the relief effort in a consequence management context	Disaster Relief Coalition; IGO lead of coalition
2	Caucasus state repressive regime, ethnic conflict	Postwar Provisional Authority and Military Occupation	NATO and UNSC	Plan for policing and rule of law in the initial postwar phase	Rule of Law Coalition; UN lead of coalition
3	West African state collapse amidst civil war	Peace implementation with a UN Transitional Authority and <i>ad hoc</i> MNF	UNSC	Plan for interim civil administration and institution building effort including/security sector	Civil administration and institution building coalition; UN-led coalition

## D. SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Finding 1:** *An agreed standard and transparent process is a necessary foundation for planning and managing international coalitions.*

**Discussion:** The multinational and multilateral partners each have different national or organizational planning processes, but they have linked them to the agreed international processes established by the United Nations (UN). The mandate for humanitarian interventions, especially in rapid onset disasters similar to the one

addressed in Working Group 1, has been assigned to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). These processes are documented in the “Oslo Guidelines” of 1994 and most nations and multilateral organizations adhere to these procedures. For complex emergencies like those addressed in Working Groups 2 and 3, the community members have linked their national processes to the UN Charter and the decisionmaking authority vested in the Security Council. Many nations cannot commit military forces to an intervention or even allow forces to transit their national territory en route to an intervention without authority of a Security Council resolution because of their national constitutions. The USG interagency community, especially at the combatant commands, often does not know or understand these processes.

On the other hand, except for its Federal Response Plan for domestic disasters, the USG has no documented processes that form the basis for planning or managing these types of contingencies. Instead, it conducts each operation on an *ad hoc* basis. Because of its size and capabilities, when the USG intervenes, it tends to dominate and impose its newly created *ad hoc* arrangements without regard to the internationally agreed processes. This unilateral action creates unnecessary friction among the potential partners and makes it more difficult to achieve timely and unified actions from the partners, especially when military forces are part of the intervention. Moreover, without a process to train to, the USG personnel are forced to create solutions “on the fly” under extreme conditions, and then, through liaison officers and other newly created *ad hoc* entities, attempt to bring the partners together into an effective and efficient coalition to accomplish the mandate.

The lack of an agreed and transparent overall USG strategy and process was discussed in each of the working groups, and was seen by most participants as a major obstacle for determining how the JIACG would function in the various scenarios and what specific value it would add in the various *ad hoc* arrangements.

### **Recommendations:**

- R1.1** The cosponsors (the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs and the Commander of JFCOM) recommend to the Secretaries of State and Defense that the sponsors work with the other members of the National Security Council to establish and document a transparent interagency process that fosters a collaborative information environment within the USG to facilitate planning and management of both military and civilian coalitions in today’s security environment.

- R1.2** The Commander of JFCOM, through the National Defense University and JFCOM/J7, and the DoS, through the Foreign Service Institute and NFATC, support training on these documented processes for all interagency community participants, especially the JIACG members.
- R1.3** The Commander of JFCOM, supported by the Foreign Service Institute and NFATC, collect and document the processes used by the key multinational and multilateral partners, and incorporate this knowledge through training programs at the National Defense University, JFCOM/J7, Foreign Service Institute, and NFATC.
- R1.4** The cosponsors recommend that the Secretary of State disseminate the transparent USG processes to other potential global partners.
- R1.5** The Commander of JFCOM, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute and NFATC sponsor an annual interagency, multinational, and multilateral exercise to practice the processes and to identify lessons to enhance the processes.

**Finding 2:** *The role and authority of the JIACG need further clarification.*

**Discussion:** The JIACG, as currently conceived, is to be a coordinating and advisory body resident at the combatant command headquarters. It is to serve as the link between the combatant command staff and the USG civilian interagency community and other multinational and multilateral partners, and provide functional advice to the commander and staff as they develop their plans. The JIACG is not to develop civilian agency operational plans or manage operations. Instead, the USG civilian agencies will accomplish these tasks elsewhere. This view represents the perspective from the military developers of the concept, but others may not share this vision.

Typically, the military planners divide operations into four phases: the peacetime engagement phase, the precrisis phase, the crisis phase, and the postcrisis phase. The focus of the workshop was on the second and fourth phases, and assumed that there would be a role for the military in each scenario. It was pointed out during the working group discussions that not all crises are resolved by the use of military force. Moreover, the USG civilian agencies play a central and often critical role during the first phase by committing their available resources to the global war on terrorism, countering drugs, fighting transnational crime, and carrying out other tasks identified in the National Security Strategy, and lack reserve capacity to surge rapidly in response to other emerging crises. While the military staffs can readily see the benefit of having civilian advice and coordinating capability alongside the combatant command's military planners

when military forces are to be employed, the value of the JIACG concept to the civilian agencies is less apparent. Many viewed the embassy and country team as the USG forward-deployed element, and by inserting the JIACG into the arrangement only made matters more complicated.

There has not been a comprehensive analysis to determine if the civilian agencies would benefit from having a “full spectrum” interagency staff cell forward deployed on a regional basis to conduct (plan and manage at the operational level) their phase 1 tasks, or to handle crises that require their agency resources, but without military involvement. Perhaps these agencies also would benefit from having forward-deployed operational planning and management capabilities, but we just don’t know. Such capabilities might enhance the USG operational planning and management of full spectrum operations envisioned for the JIACG because the civilian and military planners would be colocated and could share not only the plans, but also the rationales upon which they are based. Furthermore, there was a consensus among many of the participants that military staffs generally have significantly more capable planners and, if a civilian agency has a planner, that person is typically a high-value but low-density asset. This group thought that the USG civilian agencies will need to develop a more capable operational planning capacity, but whether the capability would be better positioned in Washington or at the combatant command is uncertain. Others thought that all agencies have planners, but they differ in kind and content from military planners. The challenge is to harmonize military and civilian planning objectives.

Another uncertainty is where and how civilian-generated operational net assessments and effects-based operations alternatives will be accomplished and employed during full spectrum operations. There was a perception from some of the civilian participants that terms like “operational net assessment” and “effects-based operations” were military coined expressions that imply military control, and to address this concern, JFCOM should clarify these concepts for the non-military partners and invite them to participate in the development of these concepts.

From the perspective of non-USG participants, the JIACG seems to be an intra-governmental organizational arrangement focused on the military requirement rather than as a solution to the needs of civilian agencies or to facilitate inter-governmental coordination within the region. Consequently, there was uncertainty expressed about the value added by multinational and multilateral partners coordinating with the JIACG. If the civilian plans are developed elsewhere and others manage the civilian resources committed to the operation, there is little apparent incentive to add the JIACG as another point for coordination. Some participants thought that the JIACG concept would be most

useful when military forces are part of the response coalition, but as the forces are reduced, the value of the JIACG also diminishes. Additionally, it is not clear what the JIACG role will be during a crisis that does not involve military forces. For example, will parent agencies be able to use the forward deployed elements at the JIACG to meet their requirements? Others saw potential benefits in morphing the JIACG into a “Combined” JIACG under the control of the Secretary General’s Special Representative to effect coordination over the disparate civilian and military entities employed during the intervention.

**Recommendations:**

- R2.1** JFCOM, supported by the appropriate DoS bureaus, and in coordination with other USG interagency partners, should conduct a study of phase 1 activities conducted by the civilian agencies and identify the value to each agency of having a forward-deployed element at the combatant command headquarters. The study should also consider the role of the JIACG staff in crises that do not involve military forces and identify the tasks and skills these individuals would need.
- R2.2** JFCOM, in coordination with the DoS and other interagency partners, should conduct additional experimentation with the JIACG concept to determine the value of placing civilian operational planners at the combatant commands versus retaining the operational planning capabilities in the agency headquarters. The experimentation should document the flow, content, and volume of information exchanged among the agency operational planners, and then between them and the military planners during the full spectrum of operations.
- R2.3** JFCOM, in coordination with the DoS, should experiment with a concept that recognizes the existence of the various international entities, but allows the JIACG to transition into a combined entity that could support a Secretary General Special Representative by establishing a collaborative information environment within the international processes, linking civilian and military organizations under various scenario conditions.
- R2.4** JFCOM, in coordination with the DoS and other USG interagency partners, should conduct experiments to determine where and how civilian-generated operational net assessments and effects-based operations can be conducted and employed during full spectrum operations.

**R2.5** JFCOM should invite the DoS and other USG interagency partners to participate in the development of interagency doctrine and procedures for conducting operational net assessments and effects-based operations.

**Finding 3:** *The use of templates, checklists, handbooks, standardization agreements, authoritative databases, and codes of best practice are useful tools that coalition members need to have available to facilitate planning and management of their operations.*

**Discussion:** The working groups identified the need to clearly delineate the tasks and responsibilities of the coalition participants to ensure there are no gaps and to eliminate potential duplication and achieve unity of effort. One member presented his thoughts on such a task structure to Working Group 3 and it is included in that group's discussion summary. The USG also has developed a generic Political-Military Plan that is currently used by the DoS (Political-Military Bureau). Over the past several years, the generic plan has been modified as lessons are identified from its application during a number of contingency situations. This template serves as a useful checklist to ensure that all relevant tasks are considered and that lead and supporting roles of various agencies are identified.<sup>1</sup>

Because of the complex and variable nature of these contingencies, there is no single tool that can be applied to provide decisionmakers with answers to all of their questions. Instead, the appropriate tool fitting the situation must be selected and applied to obtain insights useful to the decisionmaker, whether a military commander or responsible civilian. While there are some automated tools that address portions of complex emergency operations, it is often the nonautomated checklist, authoritative database, or handbook that provides the guidance that leads to a useful decision.

Many responding inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) also have relevant handbooks. For example, the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies program office has published a Coalitions Operations Handbook and the World Food Programme representative made distribution of his organization's handbook during the workshop. There are a number of authoritative databases of international capabilities

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<sup>1</sup> IDA has published document D-2166, "The United States Military Role in Smaller Scale Contingencies," that establishes a comprehensive hierarchy of civilian and military tasks based on the generic Pol-Mil Plan. This framework accommodates the full range of missions envisioned in current doctrine for military operations other than war. It also identifies the military tasks that could support non-military tasks in the sectors (e.g., diplomatic, economic, and political) that civilian partners typically lead in these contingencies.



maintained by responsible organizations such as OCHA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Governmental agencies (e.g., U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK's Department for International Development, and the Canadian International Development Agency) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the Sphere Project and the Overseas Development Institute have developed a number of codes of best practice for various functional areas.

This set of automated and nonautomated tools needs to be available to the JIACG and to other organizations involved with planning, coordinating, or managing these tasks.

**Recommendations:**

- R3.1** Joint Forces Command/J9, in coordination with DoS and other USG interagency partners, compile a list of the most relevant automated and non-automated tools and incorporate their use into the procedures used by JIACG, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, and other USG interagency partners.
- R3.2** Joint Forces Command/J9 and DoS share this list with the military and civilian multinational and multilateral partners.

**Finding 4:** *A collaborative information environment is essential for coalition operations, but national and organizational policies on exchange of information limit the implementation of such an environment.*

**Discussion:** The working group discussions identified that the exchange of classified information was restricted by national or organizational disclosure policies. Similarly, unclassified but sensitive policy information may not be readily shared in these environments. The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) is a military-led body representing six nations that is attempting to identify specific impediments to such exchanges and develop solutions to achieve a more collaborative information environment during coalition operations. It was apparent from the working group discussions that the military-led effort should be expanded to include national civilian agencies, multilateral partners, and experts in this technical field. Perhaps a workshop with these civilian and military experts could help resolve these issues more rapidly. The workshop would focus on the importance of the collaborative information environment, identification of the key partners, exactly what laws or policies apply, and how these impediments might be overcome.

**Recommendations:**

- R4.1** Joint Forces Command/J9, supported by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, encourage the MIC to expand its membership to include the civilian agencies of member national governments and key multilateral partners.
- R4.2** Joint Forces Command/J9, in coordination with the MIC, host a workshop focused on resolving impediments for the collaborative information environment.

## **CHAPTER I**

### **SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP 1 DISCUSSIONS**



## **I. SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP 1 DISCUSSIONS**

### **A. SCENARIO CONTEXT**

The scenario was cast in a Southeast Asia or Western Pacific nation. It involved an appeal by the national government to obtain urgent multinational and multilateral assistance to prevent a possible terrorist attack during an international conference to be held less than 30 days in the future. Because the attack is expected to involve chemical and biological agents, the appeal for assistance also includes international capabilities to provide relief and consequence management in the event the strike is successful. The focus of the working group was on the civilian relief coalition's operational planning and coordination, and seeks to improve harmonization of operational planning between the international military and civilian response capabilities and the host nation authorities.

### **B. WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

The working group chairman briefly welcomed the participants and reviewed the scenario and tasking. He stressed that the group's goal is to discuss coordination of activities rather than formulate a contingency plan. The participants will need to look at necessary skills and the issues that could arise and hinder a successful response. He then had the individuals introduce themselves to the other members. During the introduction, he asked the participants to identify issues they thought the group should address during the remaining sessions and provide their initial thoughts on the tasks. The highlights of the discussions during the first working group breakout session are summarized below.

#### **1. Session 1 Discussion – Introduction of Group Members and Clarification of the Group's Crisis Scenario**

The emphasis of the participants was that all action in this scenario would be triggered by the affected nation. The initial focus was on responding or not responding to the affected nation's request for assistance, and the need for clarifying the requirements.

- We need to distinguish between national-level planning and subordinate organization planning. Planning for life – long-term relationship with China (State) versus planning for a crisis – Chinese takeover of Taiwan (Defense).

- A Security Council resolution would not be necessary for United Nations (UN) agencies to respond to humanitarian crises.
- We must identify need so that authorities can authorize emergency assistance. Identify type of funding needed, and determine how funds can be obtained.
- We need to look at a regional response, how other countries could assist, consider how existing agreements with countries in region (i.e., logistical agreements) might impact the response.
- Just because an organization has capabilities, does not mean that it should have responsibility. Need to clearly delineate roles.
- Understanding common information requirements is important because many organizations overlap where information needs are concerned. Planning should take advantage of overlap, but prevent duplication of effort.
- There is an interest in clarifying authorities and how to obtain resources to execute mission.
- Identify military resources that are already present to obtain more information (i.e., about local infrastructure) because special operations and civil affairs staff may already be on ground for other missions.
- Stovepiping is a problem with larger organizations because they want to retain control of information and resources. Must strive for unity of effort: identify lead organization (supported versus supporting).
- We need to find viable information exchange mechanism, and begin the process as early as possible. Also, interest in sharing actual plans.
- We can no longer limit discussion to U.S. Government (USG) interagency community since any involvement overseas will also be mirrored by other nations, international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is not good at planning for an event that has not occurred. It will consider three possibilities ranging from best to worst case scenarios, but will not preposition assets. Like the Department of Defense (DoD), it needs to secure funding prior to response, and is difficult to do so in the absence of an attack. Organizations with staff in the threatened area would seek to take assets out of country in this scenario.

How would the planning process begin?

- The affected nation would have to ask for assistance. It needs to initiate the planning process and call the meeting before we attend.

- A civil protection scenario requires the affected government to be the driving force at all levels. We cannot effectively plan without specific requests for assistance. The affected nation would be responsible for conducting emergency assessment with the UN. What are the tools that they already have at their disposal and what tools do they still need? The response will depend on the nature of threat. In this scenario, the affected nation authorities will need to make immediate decisions on the status of the planned conference and the evacuation of citizens.
- A request for assistance would require specific information from the affected nation, such as the host capabilities, the extent of contingency planning, and intelligence on the threat.
- Military commands would conduct “what if” drills while trying to obtain as much information as possible about the nation’s capabilities and the possible threat.
- Who has capabilities that would be necessary for various agents and how will those assets be transported? The U.S. DoD may need to secure drawdown authority for funding of transportation, and would have to work through the Department of State (DoS) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to obtain information on available assets.
- No problem is entirely new, and this one would have commonalities with previous events. Different organizations already have plans for many contingencies, and often know who has the capability of producing antidotes for various agents.
- Two triggers exist: the affected nation needs to request assistance (legal authority for others to participate), and nature of the disaster needs to exceed the capability of the affected nation.
- The international community must determine how their capabilities offset the needs of the affected nation and how their participation fits into the affected nation’s implementation plan.
- The affected nation needs to work through U.S. Embassy because it is linked to the strategic policy development community in Washington, which is where USG policy is determined. The Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs) of the National Security Council are tasked based on strategic guidance. Although combatant commands can participate in bilateral discussions, they have no authority or resources for the execution of plans until directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
- Traditionally, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is not an implementing agency. It funds the involvement of others and responds after a disaster has been declared, but recent changes allow it to conduct contingency planning before an event.

- No coordination will be conducted unless called for in bilateral agreements. Every country has its own assessment team. Nations receiving a request should suggest that the affected nation ask for help through one central organization, such as the UN.

How would requirements be determined?

- We need independent analysis of conditions within the affected nation, since many countries request assistance that is not necessary. Also, affected nations will typically request information from many nations and international organizations simultaneously.
- All countries may show up at the meeting to hear the affected nation's request.

Is there a need at this point to coordinate?

- The UN should be coordinating the response for the affected nation so that responders have some type of standardization.
- OCHA attempts to keep track of assessment teams, but depends on countries reporting their participation to the UN.

When is it appropriate to begin coordination?

- Once contributors hear the assessment and decide that they will be involved, there will be three types of players: those with contingency plans in place, those with a template response, and those with no prior planning. At this point, all will need to begin to de-conflict among different types of actors.
- Each government will make own decision, although hopefully not in isolation. Once decision is made to become involved, then coordination needs to begin.
- There are some issues that will not be discussed due to political sensitivities, and other topics are not relevant to anyone outside of a specific country.
- There needs to be a decision on specific issues for coordination among various actors.

## **2. Session 2– Civilian Agency Decisionmaking**

The DoS maintains a rapid-response capability in its Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) that is designed to support the country team in the affected nation. The capability was developed to respond to crises worldwide and is an augmentation to the country team capability, not an additional coordination node. The affected nation would approach the U.S. Ambassador for assistance, although the President or Secretary of State can be contacted directly, depending on magnitude of crisis. The FEST would deploy counter terrorism (CT) and consequence management (CM) experts, whose primary mission is to support the ambassador during his coordination with the affected nation



authorities. The team would conduct a full assessment and report its findings and recommendations to the USG interagency community and affected nation authorities. It would develop a concept of operations and present it to the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) for a decision. The FEST does not provide a solution for multinational and multilateral coordination because it is driven by USG information needs. It could be expanded to include representatives and information requirements of other governments.

Many other nations would work through the existing UN mechanism. In France, the Foreign Service would be in the lead under the political authority of French government. The situation room in French Foreign Ministry, established after the event has occurred, is attended by principals, and serves as the entry point for information from the affected nation, the UN, and the French embassy. There are also emergency response teams available from the European Union (EU), which pool the resources of member nations.

Everyone has his or her own assessment team, including national teams like the USG's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), the UN Disaster Assistance Coordination (UNDAC) team, and the NGO assessment teams. The USG's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance could send an augmented DART, but it has a limited number of staff trained in chemical and biological disasters. In this scenario, it would mobilize resources from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID's) regional office in Thailand, and check on the status of other resources in the region.

- France would not want to conduct its own assessment and it would work with information obtained from its embassy, the UN, and the EU.
- Information is constantly changing from one day to the next. Someone will need to draw a line at some point to delineate information that will be used for decisionmaking.
- OFDA is trying to develop standards for assessment forms so that consistent information can be shared among nations and NGOs.
- USAID, through the U.S. embassy and regional bureau, already has NGOs funded in the affected nation and can rely on its resources already in the region.

To this point, the process that has been identified includes: indicators, the affected nation's request for assistance, the responding nations and multilateral organizations begin their assessment process, and their determination of the extent of their involvement based on assessment.

- Ambassadors (diplomatic core of affected nation) could begin consultations with each other before receiving decisions from Washington or national capitols. Consultations will narrow boundaries and will find who is going to participate.
- Coordination has to fill the gaps in national response. Responders need to know the affected nation's plans for its own response and to identify the expectations of other international involvement. The more planning completed by the affected nation, the more positive the response will be.
- Most nations do not have response capability for a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack. They do not have the necessary expertise to make specific requests.
- There is a distinction between different levels of coordination. Initial coordination gathers information for planning purposes. More formal coordination takes place during implementation stages.
- There is a need to have a designated international organization validate an assessment that can be used by all.
- The Problem with using a UN assessment is that it may not be adequate for the needs of each participant, such as containing insufficient detail for certain regional or functional requirements.
- There will be differences in the assessment of a disaster situation and the assessment of an affected nation's capability. It is more difficult to conduct an assessment of capability because the affected nation may be reluctant to allow so many different actors into their country to scrutinize their government.

Coordination is more difficult before events takes place. After an attack, necessity takes control. The subsequent discussions focused on the postattack situation.

### **3. Session 3– Precrisis Operational Planning**

An information strategy, or at least an approach, is critical, although the timing of the release of information may not be controllable. The release of information, its timing, and circumstances are very relevant, especially in this type of scenario. A contentious part of the discussion was whether to make any information public before the event. The government respondents seemed to feel none was necessary. The troubled history of not providing information or sufficiently relevant information before an event points up serious concerns with such an approach.

Public information can be a preemptive strategy by sending a signal to potential terrorists that a nation is prepared for an attack and has mobilized international resources.

The extent of the information shared with the public is a decision that has to be made by the affected government, but to consider sharing information as part of a preemptive strategy is wishful thinking. Some thought that there will be events, such as elevated threat levels or mobilization of troops, that signal a potential terrorist attack may occur, so government release of information is not necessary.

Can we have a response that does not include a public information strategy that considers the ramifications when information of a potential terrorist threat is leaked?

- There is no need to distinguish between pre- and postcrisis planning since threats remain the same. We are still dealing with the same situation.
- The threat in the precrisis stage is not really known. A threat is perceived, but its parameters and scope cannot be determined. Therefore, no one knows how much of their resources they will need to contribute. Perhaps an assessment may provide a better estimate, but the actual event will be the determining factor for resource requirements.
- The only difference is commitment of governments, which may become stronger once an attack has occurred.
- There is a difference between planning and response. During planning, we can make certain assumptions and dictate terms. We are more limited when responding to an event.

Who is part of a civilian coalition and who does precrisis planning?

- In the USG, the DART teams are part of precrisis planning, and can also preposition equipment.
- All participants may not be part of one coalition. They may be involved for their own reasons and do not necessarily want to coordinate actions. There are also a host of bilateral agreements that do not go through international coordination.
- Coalition composition depends on whether crisis resides with the affected nation or others.

Generic precrisis planning, including bilateral agreements, training, purchase and preposition of equipment, is done by all actors independently. There is a need to consider during coordination that no planning is original, so many organizations have worked together in the past leading to a common understanding of capabilities, knowledge, and personal relationships.

Different sets of rules govern the precrisis environment so that it is difficult to impose a coordinating structure during precrisis.

- The coalition has international sensitivities, particularly when USG is in the lead. They must work with the affected nation's emergency response plan.
- OCHA has the mandate to establish a coordination process for UN agencies, including facilities and communication system. The USG's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides training and checklists, USAID funds buildings and telephone banks that can be used by all international responders willing to coordinate.
- Responders can help countries that do not have the capabilities to establish a national coordinated emergency response (e.g., the UN's Onsite Operations Coordination Center)
- Not everyone will work through this coordination center, particularly NGOs.
- While the affected nation has entry control through visas prior to and after a crisis, many NGOs will already be working in-country before this crisis, and that aspect of national control has already been compromised.
- For manmade disasters, divide response into sectors. Coordination effort occurs for each specific sector (i.e., education, food, sanitation). Use NGOs as implementing partners under contractual agreement.
- Coordination with NGOs depends on their relationship with government. If funded by governments, it is easier to coordinate because they are an extension of government. Independent NGOs (own funding and agendas) have greater leeway.

We can provide an opportunity for coordination, but cannot require participation of NGOs that are not implementing partners. It is even more difficult to coordinate prior to an event because the extent of participation is not known.

- Expect the affected government to manage the response, even if it does not have full capability. If it needs coaching or direct assistance to provide information to participants on areas and sectors that still need assistance, OCHA can help.
- One consistent precrisis factor is the UN; all other actors will coalesce around it. Also, we need to consider historical relationships of the affected nation because external relationships often dictate selection of primary external partners (i.e., Francophone Africa, U.S. in the Philippines, etc.).

What are the means of communication prior to the crisis?

- There is the need to meet face-to-face and layer people onto existing coordinating mechanism as they arrive. Shut out 80 percent of participants by using technically-intensive methods of communication.

- The Tampere Agreement sets certain standards for communication (i.e., frequency of radios).
- The military is not involved in the Tampere Agreement and its commitment could improve information sharing.

#### **4. Session 4 – Information Sharing**

There is a need to establish and present a conceptual framework for planning a response. The framework should break down the problem into specific tasks, determine the host nation's capabilities for each task, and focus participants' resources on specific tasks for which the affected nation has insufficient capability.

OCHA would recommend establishing a meeting structure for various sectors. Governments and NGOs could attend the meetings. The meetings should be staggered so that all can participate (many NGOs have limited staff so the same people will be attending various meetings).

In Afghanistan, UN security officers could not obtain information from CENTCOM due to classification. Lesson learned: USG established fusion cell for Iraq and now distributes information to coalition through the UN Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC).

Participants need to share information through channels established by OCHA. Achieving communication on the ground – common equipment, agreement on frequency, availability of channels – is a constant irritant. Common operational guidelines need to be developed among individual governments, multilateral partners, and major NGOs.

NGOs have their own processes for sharing information among themselves and with others. The NGOs have limits on what information they can share due to neutrality standards. OCHA serves as interface between the military and NGO/IO community to support neutrality.

In Iraq, the process that established contracts with large commercial companies ignored small projects that could address immediate needs. It is not cost effective for corporations to complete small projects of several thousand dollars. Not all needs are being addressed when NGOs that can fulfill the need for small projects are excluded from the planning and coordination process.

As result of Iraq, the United Kingdom (UK) has found some *ad hoc* solutions to information sharing, but lessons may not have been learned by other combatant

commands. There are common themes to information that needs to be known (i.e., infrastructure). This information should be readily available, not classified.

Members of the coalition should all have same starting point. The affected government cannot coordinate without being aware of the participants' information requirements and capabilities. There needs to be a distinction between source and information. It may be possible to share information without revealing the source.

We cannot solve a problem that is not defined, so information requests need to be as specific as possible. Information-sharing problems are best addressed in face-to-face meetings with the opportunity to establish relationship, trust, and understanding. We also need an authoritative repository of information that is readily available when face-to-face meeting is not possible.

- Prior to the crisis, NGOs will not be involved. Governments will address the situation and there will be fewer coordination problems.
- We need to address what kind of information sharing needs to take place prior to the crisis. NGOs are not usually involved in precrisis planning, but that is changing after the Iraq war and there is a move by larger NGOs to plan.
- We cannot count on NGOs to have any significant role in planning. The response will be situation dependent.
- Even if NGOs are not likely participants at this point, we need to have a mechanism to include them.
- The richer the resources, the better the end state. We need to try to be as inclusive as possible.

What is the process for sharing information, in addition to face-to-face communication?

- Form interagency task force.
- Work through the umbrella organizations that encompass top NGOs, such as InterAction and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). Involve umbrella organizations upfront and allow them to notify members.
- OFDA currently holds weekly meetings with InterAction and is cohosting events with NGOs.
- Regular published products are circulated by e-mail or accessible via the Internet.
- Information on the situation on the ground acquired by DART teams is provided to others. The DART works with OCHA on the ground.

- A parallel OFDA structure is established by the Washington-based Response Management Team (RMT) in Ronald Reagan Building. An interagency team shares information within the USG and interfaces with other USG agencies and the UN.
- France does not have an information-sharing problem due to classification.

## **5. Session 5 – Options for Improving Collaborative Operational Planning**

We need to have agreed upon and accepted aims and objectives among stakeholders.

Another obstacle is lack of expertise. Developed countries have plans for a biological attack at home, but not abroad; however, work on a domestic situation can apply elsewhere.

One of the obstacles is that the emergency response capabilities of the affected nation may be unknown or nonexistent. Even if plans exist, they may have never been tested.

- They do not have enough time to exercise plans.
- Only since 9/11 has there been any attention paid to possible terrorist attacks and actual testing of the plans through exercises.
- There is limited international experience in responding to a chemical or biological attack.
- East-West confrontation countries have specialized military units that are trained and equipped, but limited civilian capability is available on the humanitarian side.
- The agent needs to dissipate before the humanitarian component could participate.
- Break problem down into various components that can be dealt with.
- Different languages and cultures and incomplete appreciation of capabilities (what can others bring to bear and how do we integrate them into our plans) also impact the response.
- Some discussions will be tainted by who is going to pay.
- Many countries have same capabilities, and there is only so much of any resource that is necessary for the response (i.e., food or clothes)
- There is a political dimension. Countries that asked for assistance may not want to be involved and risk the possibility of being blamed for a poor response.

- Countries may not contribute depending on who else is participating. The affected nation needs to have a vetting process to determine possible conflicts.
- Initially, planning is conducted in isolation based on information obtained from embassies.
- There may be a difference between the willingness to commit and the capability to deliver. For example, one might be able to contribute resources but unable to transport them.
- Different communication systems and languages hinder coordination.
- The host nation may intentionally underestimate resources to attract more assistance.
- The Cable News Network (CNN) factor is another problem because the press can drive the campaign plan.
- It works both ways – without media coverage no one may be interested in an event because they are unaware.

Given problems and obstacles, is there a way to improve coordination or are these just environmental hazards?

- We are largely not able to impact the process. We must just learn to deal with the problem.
- There needs to be a validation process for affected nation assessments.
- Priorities and benchmarks may be very different among stakeholders.
- The desire to resolve specific problem (possibility of terrorist attack) versus the desire to address larger problems in the affected nation (causes of instability) may cause conflict among responders.
- None of these problems will prevent a response. It is simply part of the environment that needs to be taken into consideration during planning.
- Divide the response into manageable parts and assign tasks after the division.
- Use a matrix of task and resource providers. Everyone needs to have a common understanding of tasks and then match those tasks with the participants' capabilities.
- Just because policies do not match (U.S. versus Germany in Iraq) does not mean that their institutions are not going to cooperate. Through established processes and long-standing relationships, they are able to coordinate plans.
- Institutionalize the venue to discuss obstacles.
- Develop a common doctrine to address problems. If a country should chose to participate in an event, the doctrine can serve as a common point of departure as a nonbinding agreement.



- Establish a standing committee of experts for coordination in a crisis situation.
- Rely more heavily on regional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

What is the role of Joint Inter Agency Task Force (JIACGs) as coordinating mechanisms in this type of scenario?

Many USG participants thought the JIACG concept, developed by the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) without interagency coordination on the draft, would have little relevance outside of DoD. The international participants agreed that there was no value in discussing how the JIACG would contribute to this scenario because the element was determined to be a USG internal organization that would only be used to help coordinate the overall American response. There would be no international communication with a JIACG unless some of its members were part of a Joint Task Force (JTF) assigned to the USG assessment teams.

- OCHA will not send anyone to JIACG to coordinate; it needs to coordinate at the location of the disaster.
- France also has JIACGs and they are called embassies.
- OCHA deals with many countries, and each has its own coordinating mechanism. It works with one point of contact (POC) in each country. The USG is the only country that has not figured this out and has not identified its one POC. By placing the national POC in the combatant command, it is unable to cooperate with other elements in the international community. The disaster response coordination should work through DoS (actually OFDA) as other nations do.
- The POC could communicate through a virtual network.
- We want to avoid leaving a large footprint on the JIACG and use many different means of coordination.
- OCHA needs a person within USG who can make decisions; there will be no coordination with the JIACG if it does not have the authority to execute the plan. If the JIACG is an internal coordinating mechanism for the USG then, by definition, there is no role for non-USG actors.

U.S. military and DoD personnel participating in this workgroup were split as to the usefulness of the JIACG in this scenario. Those who believed that the JIACGs would have a significant role in this scenario failed to convince any of the other participants of its value beyond being an internal component in the USG coordination effort. Furthermore, some other workgroup participants failed to see its usefulness under any circumstance.

## **6. Session 6 – Future Experimentation Opportunities and Preparation of a Working Group Briefing**

In preparation for its presentation to the plenary session, the working group identified the following scenario assumptions:

- Civil protection situation
- Affected nation has limited crisis management capabilities
- Requested international assistance
- Threat is beyond affected nation capabilities (validates request for outside assistance).

Overview for the briefing included the following points:

- The capacity and competence of the affected nation is a key factor in planning and during the response.
- Two categories of affected governments – those that are competent but need technical assistance, and those that are not competent and need much greater assistance.
- The UN (OCHA) currently does global planning and is on the ground in all second-category countries with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its resident representatives. In addition, OCHA and colleagues have appropriate mandates, onhand resources, information-gathering capability, develop generic planning, and have relationships with other governments, set of response Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and necessary experience.
- The international response should fall under the UN, and should assist in further development of UN coordination mechanisms.

Key issues for discussion:

- Validated assessment
- Commonality of aims and objectives
- Harmonization and coordination of effort (affected nations, other governments, IOs, and NGOs)
- Planning
- Information exchange
- Task sharing.

Information sharing issues:

- Understanding problems

- Language barriers
- Cultural differences.

Ways to improve collaboration:

- Generic planning and exercises under IO auspices
- Make lessons learned available
- Strive for clear understanding of the problem by breaking the problem down, dividing and assigning tasks, developing and using task lists
- Use common venue to resolve issues.



## **CHAPTER II**

### **SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP 2 DISCUSSIONS**



## **II. SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP 2 DISCUSSIONS**

### **A. SCENARIO CONTEXT**

The scenario was cast in an oil-rich Caucasus nation recently taken over by a repressive, extremist regime with strong terrorist connections. The regime repressed the country's minority population, forcibly deported its small ethnic Russian community, and provided clandestine support to *al Qaeda* operatives seeking to conduct attacks against Turkey's western-leaning government. In reaction to European diplomatic efforts to end its rogue practices, the extremist regime cut off its supply of oil to European states, hitting southern European states particularly hard, and reports indicate that the regime is now making preparations for the massive slaughter of its minority population. In response to these events, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has authorized a NATO-sponsored military campaign to stop the genocide and remove the repressive regime from power. A military operation of 80,000 troops is to be led by Italy with major contributions provided by France, UK, Germany, the U.S. and partner nations in the Caucasus. The United States European Command (USEUCOM) will provide one armored division of some 20,000 troops to the NATO operation.

Anticipating a large scale postwar reconstruction effort lasting some two years, the UN Security Council directed the UN Secretary General to make immediate preparations for a postwar UN-led International Provisional Authority (UNIPA) to lead the international civilian effort in which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU and the Arab League would assist in providing essential civilian capacity that would include relief, civil administration, rule of law, and economic development. NATO would lead the international military effort to impose stability with the force commander provided by the UK. NATO's military occupation would support the Provisional Authority as genuine partners.

The focus of the working group was on the civilian rule of law coalition's operational planning and coordination. It sought to improve harmonization of operational planning and coordination between the military occupation coalition and the civilian rule of law coalition.

## B. WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS

After a brief welcome and orientation by the working group chairman, individuals introduced themselves to the other members and identified issues they thought the group should work to resolve during the remaining sessions. The major issues introduced were as follows:

- The need for strategic guidance imperative; reachback to host government to develop guidelines for operational-level implementation. If strategic guidance is weak, operational or interagency planning is not coordinated. Assumptions with regard to the strategic level are critical; if they prove invalid, the plan needs to be reengineered.
- The need for three workshops (multilateral, international, and interagency) because issues are too large to be combined.
- The need to reach a consensus on the development of political-military planning (in particular, planning authorities and process) during interagency collaboration.
- A marketing plan for interagency planning, specifically a DoD-oriented initiative is required or the effort will fail. Take the ideas out to the community.
- How far cooperation can be taken before institutional imperatives are compromised is a major impediment to effective collaborative operational implementation.
- The transition from military to civilian agencies is a new area of study for the UK.
- Much of what we discuss is limited by what we know, or can do now rather than by the future capabilities we should be developing as enduring fixes.
- The importance of personalities. The mandate for coordination is different across agencies and the people typically sent as Liaison Officers (LNOs) are second rate.
- “Ugly” was the American interagency process in Iraq. The process is *ad hoc*, imperious and uncoordinated.
- Fundamental similarities exist in all postconflict situations even though all situations are different. We need to understand what they are and develop a systematic approach in the future.
- Major departmental orientations should align their view of the world map (e.g., Unified Command Plan, State regional bureaus, etc.) so the USG response and planning can be better coordinated using standard demarcations between regions of the globe.



The highlights of the discussions during the first working group breakout session and subsequent periods are summarized below.

## **1. Session 1 Discussion – Introduction of Group Members and Clarification of the Group’s Crisis Scenario**

Based on the strategic guidance, a holistic approach to the consensus problem should be developed, coordinated, and implemented. For Rule of Law (RoL) issues, this becomes difficult because of ethnocentric orientations, political restrictions (e.g., building jails, etc.), and national expectations.

There is a need for a “trigger” mechanism to begin the process of planning, which activates the interagency, multinational, and multilateral communities to integrate their activities. There also needs to be an agreed upon planning template (in political-military plan format) which captures the elements of collaboration and agreement (with milestones) leading to coordinated implementation. Perhaps thought should be given to re-establishing Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 56 to layout a USG process for planning and managing complex emergencies.

Allocating more time at the strategic level can be accomplished by earlier, rather than later, decision making to begin thinking about and acting on planning. Sharing planning assumptions can help focus those efforts.

There needs to be more discipline in the USG legislative arena to support interagency collaboration and cooperation. There is a need for serious consideration of an interagency equivalent of the “Goldwater-Nichols” legislation to align the interaction of the relevant civilian agencies inside the Executive Branch of government.

The mindset is that the intervention will always be a military-led operation. It may not be, and another civilian agency might lead. Also, the nature of modern conflict is such that the character of the conflict is dynamic so that the “lead” must change (i.e., from security to law enforcement to humanitarian to reconstruction).

Effects-based planning tools exist but are not commonly understood or employed. We need to harmonize, coordinate, and integrate activities – leadership! The role of the Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary General was highlighted.

## **2. Session 2– Civilian Agency Decisionmaking**

The U.S Department of Justice (DoJ) does not see itself in the lead for foreign law enforcement training activities until designated by DoS, at which point contract with a

commercial enterprise to do the actual training, much like the USAID performs humanitarian activities overseas.

- The requirements are based on assessment of the ground (i.e., analysis) coordination across interagency lines.
- May require basing of staff in-country to manage or monitor programs.
- Activities are coordinated with UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL).
- Assessment is based on U.S. standards and assumptions.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) supplies Canadian seconded assets to international policing training or operational requirements; some are only advisors with no police powers while others are for training purposes only.

- Some needs are for operational purposes (guard duty) under an international organization.
- Canada can tap into provincial assets as well as federal forces that benefit the service as well as the individual (professional growth and development, and fiscal benefits, too).
- Police can take a leave of absence for temporary duties to make extra pay.
- For multilateral operations the organization (i.e., the UN or OSCE) controls the police specialists and provides the training and structure under which they operate.
- Create training modules that fit the spectrum of possibilities likely to be encountered.

There is a need for an umbrella international organization, under which all of the component parts of the “policing” problem are evaluated and assessed, and the needs are addressed. Nevertheless, there is a paramount “first-need” for area security within which the police can operate.

- How the local police are reintegrated into the new process depends upon the circumstance. Vetting is critical and depends upon the previous level of professionalism that exists; corruption in the ranks will make progress more difficult.
- Police are only the apprehension arm of a larger system of justice that needs to be in place or the process of justice will not function. A judiciary supported by prosecutorial and defense counsels, and penal institutions is also needed.
- Early on, attention must be given to the nature and application of previous and existing legal codes. The establishment of new legal codes will be

particularly problematic if it is not based on a blend of traditional and western values.

- Initially, the police and military planners should be merged to coordinate the rules of engagement so that there is an agreed strategy to transition between the two and to finally exit at some future indefinable point.
- Goes back to the mandate that sets the conditions and parameters within which the operation is conducted.
- Planning is based on assumptions that may change so the planning process and resulting plan must be flexible enough to accommodate a dynamic situation on the ground.
- *“Problems hit you at the speed of light, analysis at the speed of sound, and solutions at the speed of bureaucracy.”*

It is possible that we could become over-committed, thereby triggering donor fatigue. Is the UN the right institution to coordinate these activities and, if so, what is the mechanism for coordination: doctrine or tenets of interagency collaboration that are agreed upon by all parties?

Within the USG, the Joint Inter Agency Task Force (JIATF) South works because each national component supports its own national strategic objective, which means there is a buy-in on the part of all. Also implied is a consensus strategic vision that has been preapproved by the various national-level leaders.

Given a strategic consensus, how do we implement an action element at the operational level?

- The role of the military is to establish a secure environment within which specialized civilian agencies, both official and non-governmental, can operate.
- If, on the other hand, the military is to do it all, then the opportunity cost is enormous; for what do they train and equip?
- On the ground, the military can make short-term changes because they have the manpower and resources, but when the military leaves there is no long-term sustainable capacity left behind unless a self-sustaining, peaceful environment has been achieved and civilian resources are deployed.

Prior to employment, military commanders should consider seconding planners to civilian organizations to augment their planning expertise, to rationalize resource allocations, and to develop transition strategies. Adaptive planning processes will bring civilian agencies into the planning structure throughout the developmental actions of reconstruction planning.

- The issue of neutrality is important for most NGOs. Many NGOs will not interact effectively with the military because of their orientation and sponsorship.
- Some will also hire contract security specialists rather than engage with the military.
- A hierarchy of coordination mechanisms is lacking that brings all the diverse elements together.
- The USG Office of Management and Budget (OMB) needs representation in the conflict areas to gain an appreciation of the operational environment so prompt decisions on funding requirements are possible. Planners need to understand where the fiscal spigots are that turn on the money.

We need to develop a set of principles (tenets of interagency coordination and planning) for interagency coordination and multinational and multilateral planning. These processes of interagency coordination at the strategic and operational levels need to be exercised to rehearse the steps that work and identify problem areas. They also need a directive that will trigger USG interagency planning like the UK Chief of Defence Staff directives (other UK Ministries have equivalent mechanisms).

### **3. Session 3 – Precrisis Operational Planning**

USAID has centralized decisionmaking, ignores operational considerations and input from the field, and frequently employs contractors as their instruments of action.

- This complicates the process of decisionmaking because it takes time to reach a decision point and the desired effect is often overcome by events.
- USAID is a development agency, not a crisis action agency. It operates under multiyear plans (5-year plan) with a long-term view and is constructed from the ground up to build economies and large-scale infrastructure. Over time, it got into the softer developmental programs.
- USAID must plan budget 2 years in advance, so it is relatively inflexible to address current crises.
- Some subdirectorates (e.g., the Office of Transitional Initiatives and OFDA) can react quickly and are specifically equipped for the 1-year targeted development or recovery projects.
- USAID is not an independent agency. It comes under policy guidance of DoS and requires constituency building for long-term social improvement.
- USAID has recently gone to the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI; formerly PKI) to develop a closer relationship that may expedite USAID's incorporation into Army stability operations. The

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is not aware or informed of this activity, and PKSOI is still in its formative stage.

- USAID is prohibited by law from giving or sharing funding with the military. Most USAID programs are earmarked by Congress.

In Iraq, U.S. contractors were not permitted to operate in nonpermissive areas. The U.S. military determined which areas were clear or not, and this often made coordination with USAID difficult.

Prioritization requires empowered leadership. The UK has formed “unity of effort” working groups that coordinate vertically and horizontally.

Regarding funding:

- Units in the field need “walking around money,” but USAID and OMB require fiscal accountability which is a built-in obstacle to getting the little jobs done fast.
- OMB must deploy contingency groups capable of making timely financial assessments leading to action decisions in the crisis area.

#### **4. Session 4– Information Sharing**

Information sharing can make or break an operation, but there is no efficient system of sharing knowledge. Information is tiered and provided according to the reliability of allies and NGOs.

- Over-classification, primarily within military organizations, complicates decisionmaking because there is a very weak system of deciding what needs to be classified.
- Release to others exacerbates this issue, especially with allies. A coalition network is hard to establish and most bits of information default to the national system, not to the coalition process.
- There should be a return to the older system where the information, not the system, is classified. Tagging information needs a clear process with guidelines and enforcement mechanisms to take precedence over classification.
- Use of LNOs can circumvent classification blockage if there is trust and confidence that the information will not cause harm to national security. This process requires bilateral agreements worked out in advance because the host country or organization must certify the LNO to combat misinformation or misuse.

- Foreign disclosure cells at various levels of command can assist in expediting the release process.

The point was made that the U.S. Army War College conducts an annual Strategic Crisis Exercise in March involving U.S. and foreign students at the college. In years past, the exercise was criticized by the international fellows because they were denied access to information and intelligence for the exercise. In recent years, the college has developed ways to be more inclusive, and these procedures may have potential for improving the collaborative information environment sought by the JIACG concept.

The volume of information is another dimension, and how it is analyzed to provide the right information to the decisionmakers is yet another challenge. This underscores the need for analysis in an information overload environment that leads to information pathology.

- Not all information needs to be acted upon and not all leaders need to be totally informed.
- We need more human intelligence (HUMINT) and less signals intelligence (SIGINT). There is a need for a cultural link to back up the human reporting.
- The problem calls for fusion cells where collective (civilian and military) staff can evaluate the information.
- We need to know if another layer or filter on information accessibility and releaseability is imposed.
- The role of the diplomatic mission must be considered in information flow to ensure that political considerations are fully taken into account.
- The UK civil-military contact group establishes a relationship between the military and the NGO community. This deals with broad policy issues at a strategic level.
- The U.S. needs a similar standing group that can establish and maintain relationships with the NGO community.
  - OCHA runs a civil-military course 6 times a year to bring groups together.
  - U.S. military does not do a good job of training its units for interaction with NGOs. This calls for a solid educational program for the military and civilian units that deploy to contingency areas.

We must establish working relationships ahead of time on a bilateral and multilateral basis as a means to develop the trust and confidence between institutions. If interagency and foreign exchange programs are supported as routine parts of governmental and international norms, a cadre of accredited personnel will be created.

However, personalities play heavily in determining what and how information gets shared. Technology can't overcome this human factor.

## **5. Session 5 – Options for Improving Collaborative Operational Planning**

Assessment is the first step in joint planning. It helps to identify options that are available, and serves as the first step where coordination needs to begin to integrate and develop a consensus plan.

- Critical resources include time and funding.
- Habitual relationships that are well established will cut down the time required.
- There is a need for a common vocabulary, including a dictionary of terms and tasks that are agreed upon.
- Early exchange of trained and competent military or civilian LNOs with multilateral organizations (third party interaction) and possibly NGOs is necessary.
- The role of the JIACG with organizations outside of the USG or as a subcomponent at the task force level is unclear.

The RoL has many parts, including an educational component. Cultural orientation matters because it will determine the type of legal system that will be put in place. In many cases, it will require culling out the parts that are out of line with modern legal processes.

The value of the JIACG and the number of functions it will perform will be greater when applied to planning for the military forces from initial entry into the complex contingency through the transition to civilian authority, but the value declines as the UN civilian authorities assume control and postconflict activities begin.

- Make the JIACG an international entity so it has the capability to fit into the multinational structure and affect coordination across the various sectors as postconflict reconstruction continues.
- Make the JIACG an open tool that can even go down to the tactical level, at which level the LNOs constitute a semi-JIACG cell.
- European countries use NATO as their planning staff. JIACG would need to be at NATO to be familiar with the planning processes of the multinational components (i.e., combined interagency JIACG).

- The need for a technical collaborative communications tool capability (i.e., training, resource allocation, connectivity, etc.) exists but the political will is lacking.

The composition of the JIACG must be flexible enough to provide a value to the commander, and positioned according to where it can best leverage the sum of its component parts.

- Tailoring of the JIACG is not possible until missions and aims are agreed upon.
- Civilian and military RoL plans need to be synchronized and harmonized.
- They are coordinated with the NATO force commander, but under the UN for this scenario.
- The military will not write the plan but will support its implementation by the UN. The JIACG role is to coordinate the three plans to ensure harmonization.
- The number of staff varies based on the needs as identified by the commander.
- The interagency community only goes where the action is. It doesn't do the same type of planning because agency objectives differ from DoD's, and they are typically only one deep in personnel. The DoD has surge capacity and can float people without a negative impact on performance.
- JIACG planning products will be looked upon with skepticism because that entity is a part of the DoD combatant command. They do pulse the "metropol" because the civilian staff elements within the JIACG will be in constant touch with their Washington headquarters.
- Calls for a radical restructuring of USG to address the future implies the need for implementing legislation that is directive in nature and has enforcement provisions.

## **6. Session 6 – Future Experimentation Opportunities and Preparation of Working Group Briefing**

Bring in the NGOs, warts and all. Some governments can be brought down by NGOs, which have real power.

- NGOs bring value to humanitarian tasks but not many for RoL issues.
- NGOs can be a force multiplier based on the mission by taking care of refugees, etc., but they do not want to be viewed as being under any organization's control, especially military organizations.



Bring in organizational design specialists to review the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the JIACGs and evaluate their informational and security aspects.

- Is the JIACG authority an intragovernmental or intergovernmental entity, with whom does it interface and how?
- Adding layers of UN entities, the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) of DoS, and the architecture gets more complicated.
- We need to establish agreed principles to underpin multinational and multilateral operations.



## **CHAPTER III**

### **SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP 3 DISCUSSIONS**



### **III. SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP 3 DISCUSSIONS**

#### **A. SCENARIO CONTEXT**

The scenario was cast in a sub-Saharan Africa nation. It involved a violent internal conflict in a failed state with historical links to the United States. There is no government civil administration anywhere in the country, and rivalries among armed groups and child soldiers have exacerbated the large humanitarian crises, including the lack of food, potable water, rampant diseases with little to no medical assistance while presenting a significant threat to international relief personnel.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) has accepted a U.S. request to lead a “green helmet” multinational force of U.S., European, and West African contingents to restore military stability to the country and conduct a demobilization of armed factions under a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. The USEUCOM will lead the military component of the mission. The focus of the working group was on the civilian coalition operational planning to provide civil administration and build institutions (including the security sector). The group sought improvements and harmonization of operational planning and coordination between the *ad hoc* military peace implementation coalition and the civilian civil administration coalition.

#### **B. WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

After a brief welcome and orientation by the working group chairman, individuals introduced themselves to the other members and identified issues they thought the group should work to resolve during the remaining sessions. The major issues introduced were as follows:

- The importance of stakeholders
- Security concerns that allow all players to get in the door when critical planning information is classified
- A coherent approach despite multiple agendas and inevitable time pressures
- A common Operating Picture for all players
- Interoperability among military and other actors on the ground

- Organizational political will and strategic planning timelines
- Coordination versus control among independent agencies
- Improve the process for international community
- Educating the military on what goes on in the interagency environment to get the word out
- The process and mechanisms for military lead and coordination in an operations area
- The coordination and management of an information campaign
- Exit strategies and time frames as they differ among involved parties
- Civilian participation in planning and exercises
- How to get critical information to the Combatant Commands without inundating them
- How to transition from military to civilian control
- The standardization of coalition activities and identification of key actors in a situation
- Interfacing with the military and keeping it out of humanitarian operations
- Using the interagency process as a template for the U.S. Strategic Command's new missions
- How to marry agency cultures and objectives to accomplish a single goal
- Specific ideas for improving joint military doctrine and response
- The need for principles before undertaking operations
- The critical necessity of improving communications and processes among USG interagency players.

The working group chairman reviewed the scenario, noting that the environment is more secure than it was, but not completely safe, and that Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) is needed. The initial thoughts of the group follow:

- Planners must understand the situation and what all players bring to it. Have external players been consulted before reaching a settlement? The capacity of the indigenous population needs to be considered.
- There will be a need for patrols to secure the area by throwing a “wet blanket” over the current situation. Include both military and civilian police in the process.
- Establish normalcy through an arbitration entity.

- We need to develop performance measures for peace operations, using lessons learned from former operations.
- Establish coordination center to deconflict priorities and achieve synergy prior to troops hitting the ground, realizing that situations unravel over time instead of overnight.

## **1. Session 2 – Civilian Agency Decisionmaking**

There is a need for a common overall objective for all players because each is being evaluated on accomplishing different goals and organizational mandates (i.e., military security versus food delivery). A task list that identifies stakeholders for each task would be useful for establishing relationships among coalition partners.

- Integrate elements of the transitional authority through clear planning and use of various communications media.
- We can only manage the chaos, but should establish the task list to address and prioritize the critical issues given that limited resources will never allow everything to be accomplished.
- We must improve and harmonize the planning cycle by establishing planning mechanisms and coordination.
- We must improve the capacity of the civilian community to respond to the situation knowing that military involvement is usually contentious (limit its need?).
- We need to understand the relationship between the economy, banking institutions, and existing political parties.

Based on these comments, the working group chairman directed the participants to place themselves in the role of the transitional authority as a basis for subsequent discussions.

The first priority task is security. Other priority tasks include the following:

- DDR.
- Establishing a civil administration and initiate institution building.
- Consider returning the society to the indigenous people and begin thinking of elections.
- Integrate civilian leaders (e.g., religious leaders and women's groups) into plans for the return to normalcy.
- Exit strategies for not only military, but also all international stakeholders.

The primary goal is to achieve stability. To do that, the following steps must be taken:

- Separate factions – coalition military (i.e., commander and all components), aid donors, neighboring countries, religious leaders, and political party leaders
- Disarm (at encampments) – resources critical
- Retrain – funds for retraining comes mostly from World Bank and EU
- Establish border security – military coalition, private sector, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- Establish a civil police force (law and order) – military coalition, civilian police, private sector, and ECOWAS may be necessary
- War crimes and crimes against humanity must be addressed.

Will the UN always be the lead agency? What other countries may have a stake in the situation?

## **2. Session 3 – Precrisis Operational Planning and Session 4 – Information Sharing**

Because of the wide-ranging discussions during the previous session, the working group chairman divided the group into four subgroups: Security Sector Reform, Civil Administration, Constitutional and Political Institutions, and Economic Institutions. The purpose was to focus more on the problems presented by the scenario. The initial morning session was spent in subgroup discussions of specific planning objectives and goals. The second morning session consisted of the subgroup briefing the main group of the results of their individual discussions.

Before the breakout occurred, one of the participants introduced a matrix of tasks that he developed in the evening after the workshop adjourned. His presentation described the process in terms of steps to achieve a desirable end state for a stable independent country with growth potential. It outlines interim steps and a general time line. It has four components: an effective government, a secure environment, economic stability, and economic development through stability. The matrix shown in Table III-1 identifies component tasks that need to be addressed and accomplished.



**Table III-1. International Intervention Operations Matrix**

c. Transitional Authority					Sovereign Authority				
International Intervention				Exit Strategy					
Initial Intervention	Stability Development	Transition to National Authority			Withdrawal	Mission Success			
6 months	6 months	2 years			1 year				
		Develop national oversight, conduct elections, train & integrate national administrative bodies	Constitution		Effective Governance	A stable independent country with growth potential			
			Electoral Process						
			National & Provincial Administrations						
IV. Humanitarian Intervention				Secure & Stable Environment					
	Emergency Assistance	Long-term Assistance							
	Food, Water & Shelter	Food, Water, & Shelter							
	Repatriation	Repatriation							
		Public Services							
		*****							
V. Military Intervention									
Separation and isolation of forces	Detain, Disarm, & Reintegrate		National HQ			National Defence Force			
		Mil stability ops	Field Force						
		Train & integrate national capabilities	Train & Sustain						
	IPTF Ops		Police Authority	Judicial Process					
		Train & integrate national capabilities	Court System						
			Prison Service						
	International Sy Ops		Customs	Border Security					
			Immigration						
		Train & integrate national capabilities	Agriculture & Fisheries						

The summary of the morning briefings from the four subgroups are presented below:

**a. Security Sector Reform Subgroup**

The subgroup assumed that deliverables were the same as agenda items 1 and 2. The recurring substantive issues were as follows:

- We need top-down guidance for operational planning to end state identification. What do principals want you to accomplish?
- The appropriate basis for making assumptions, which will be necessary.
- We need comprehensive intelligence across a broad spectrum, including all, not just coalition, sources, but indigenous as well.
- We need to know monetary constraints. What funding is available and possible?
- Identify sources of all other nonmonetary resources. What will specific coalition members contribute?
- We need to know time line. Determine the schedule from how long you have. Time line is to prioritize tasks and ensure security aspects are covered.
- We need to understand the capabilities of forces and resources available, which will vary by coalition member, whether they are military or non-military, and whether they are for traditional or non-traditional tasks.
- We need to know when cessation of hostilities will occur and what ended the conflict, that is, the agreements and promises made to warring parties.

A number of substantive cross-functional issues were identified.

- Mutually supporting tasks. Identify where there is a need to provide support.
- Get responsibility transition points: Who is responsible? When does it shift between military and civilian?
- Identify lines of responsibility and transition points within the security coalition, between it and other coalitions, and with the broader civilian community of Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), IOs, NGOs, and domestic authorities.
- Prioritization and integration of logistical support systems and identification of limitations of contract logisticians if hostilities resume. Initial logistics are provided by the military, but transitions to civilian contractors. After time, military logistics become backup to civilian contractors, but some logistics are initially done by contractors for the military.

- Confidence building measures between antagonists; between coalition and IGOs, IOs, and NGOs; and between coalition of IGOs, IOs, and NGOs and the indigenous population.
- Detention and arrest regimes, including rules of engagement (ROE) for detention and arrest of troublemakers, criminals, and other spoilers.
- International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) presence for internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees.
- Freedom of movement for IDP and refugees across borders and within borders involving domestic transit for indigenous and coalition persons.

**b. Civil Administration Subgroup**

The subgroup addressed a series of issues, but attempted to identify a process to reinstate a viable civil service in the affected nation. It considered measures of effectiveness important to determine whether the plan is working as anticipated so that adjustments can be made if necessary. The measures need to be transparent both within and outside of the coalition. Specific activities include the following:

- We need to know the end state, the purpose of the coalition, the goal, and what it looks like. Is it a Western definition of Civil Authority or something more compatible with local capacities? This information aids the establishment of priorities for the goals and objectives.
- We need a national assessment to determine needs and capabilities, and a prioritization issue for energy and resources
- Among external donors and coalition members, who has the lead? Who are the major regional or historical players, major IGOs, IOs, and NGOs providing resources?
- What approach is desired: Top down, bottom up, grass roots, or a combination?
- Identify the process for membership selection into the emerging civil service. What skills are sought and what training will be required? What is the health status of potential civil service members (e.g., HIV/AIDS infected)?
- The history and allegiance of former civil service members. Will the population trust them or will a totally new labor pool be needed?
- The use of expatriates and repatriates – pros and cons – and will they return?
- The training requirements for civil servants. The time line and the resources available for mentoring and training, and the model and design of the system.

The proposed process would follow these steps:

- Identify the lead agency. Who will act as mentor and authority in the first case?
- Develop a trusteeship. Establish interim UN authority to provide legitimate control until trained, proficient locals can take over.
- Institute transitional civil service for a national and regional structure.
- Identify and train civil servants.
- Identify and develop mentors.
- Hand off to trained service corps of local civil service.

Critical issues to identify while taking these steps include identifying methods of communicating and establishing the appropriate lines of authority. Identifying and communicating with the sources of support for restoration tasks is also important. The collection and use of information and available media to manage data and messages to targeted audiences will be necessary. It provides a means of knowing what is going on, and forms a basis for analysis of whether progress is or is not being made. It provides a necessary feedback mechanism to inform the management body not only for the humanitarian sector, but for all sectors. Everything needs to be brought together for analysis to solicit more funds and support, to demonstrate capacity, and to identify needs and successes. Information will come in too quickly and from too many sources to easily and correctly analyze and collate. Anticipate a lot of bottlenecks. Information technology and physical capacity need to be carefully planned.

- Joint information campaign – multinational and multicoalition – with common goals and message, common means of determining success and failure, and information flows within the coalition and between the coalition and indigenous population.
- Agreement is needed on how to determine measures of effectiveness.
- Corruption and ability of civil service to function with respect and transparency. Does the local population respect the civil service? If not, how do you build that sense of respect within civil service and between it and the population? We need to destroy prior culture of corruption and graft and build a new culture of professionalism and civil duty.
- HIV/AIDS is a drain on resources and the ability of nationals to respond. Medical capabilities will be critical. HIV/AIDS will diminish, if not wipe out, the potential manpower pool. The educated pool will be decimated and there will be difficulty finding qualified people. HIV/AIDS will impact all aspects of civil society and governance.

**c. Constitutional and Political Institutions**

Although there is no legitimate government, some structures will exist, possibly a government in exile, and some leaders will need to be identified. Other questions to be addressed include the following:

- What is the history of elections? Is there a constitution to revise, or use as a template to alter, or must one be created?
- What should the government look like? Should there be a President or Prime Minister with a parliamentary system?
- What needs to be done to get elections started? What are the interim steps?

There will be a need to obtain international agreement on the end state and interim steps to achieve it. These steps include:

- Ethnic, indigenous, and other factions to buy into the process, end state, time line, and guideposts for measuring progress.
- A decision must be made of who will run the process and determine its shape.
- Get international support, including money, resources, people, etc.
- Generate political parties. How will new parties be formed? What cultural, ethnic, and factional issues will dominate?
- Information distribution, including the systems and nature of information distribution to the various target audiences such as the international community, refugees, ex-pats, and domestic population.
- Registration systems and voting systems must be established.
- Postelectoral support. Ensuring the results of elections provides a chance to establish validity.
- Funding will be critical. We need an assessment to determine priorities and to make sure the elected government has resources and legitimacy.
- Who are the regional and international partners that will support the new government and join the supporting coalitions?
- Cross-functional issues include obtaining IGO, IO, and NGO support, and addressing refugees.
- Establish military and civilian support and cooperation for elections, and to ensure stability viability of elections.
- End state: a viable and sustainable system with indigenous buy-in and support. The goal is a self-sufficient and sustainable society.

- Press will be critical with reliance on radio, not newspapers or TV, because of distribution problems and availability of TV receivers. Need a free, yet responsible, press.
- Bring in trainers (NGOs) to develop political parties.
- Assume a degree of positive political will within the country, and establish an agreed time line and goals to set a positive environment for democratization.
- Assume a working model for constitutional reform. We need a referendum on constitutional revisions and a time line for buy-in.
- We need an election assessment for unique urban and rural election needs, priorities, system design, voting codes, etc.
- Who will take the lead on election monitoring, for its design, determining its viability, and providing needed resources?
- 12 to 30 million people may need ID/registration cards. Who will determine the system and fund it?
- The Elections Commission – membership and function – must have credibility both regionally and domestically.
- The media (radio coverage must be responsible and fair) should be monitored by domestic and international regulators. National coverage is required and must be deemed free from ethnic or factional domination.
- Identify regional and international support organizations to build the media, run elections, and restore civil and political society.
- There are likely to be several political parties – some established, some new – who will need reform and/or training. They must be uniform in design and allocated comparable resources.
- The balance of power among government branches and office holders will require training to determine their duties, limits of power, oversight needs, and accountability. A local watchdog capability is necessary.

**d. Economic Institutions**

The subgroup assumed they were the transitional authority and focused on what they needed to accomplish. They wanted to maintain what was working and/or would invest in those things that would contribute to productivity – ports are a key to economic productivity, all players have interests that collect in ports.

- In a modern economy, currency stability is critical and we must identify requirements to ensure trade can function at both the local and international levels.

- A national budget must be established. All players – military and civilian – are key.
- The infrastructure critical to subsistence food production is ports. Military forces, labor unions, and civil society all depend on ports, which provide employment.
- Key revenue-generating infrastructure, such as seaports and airports, must be given high priority in reconstruction efforts.
- Economic restructuring will depend on international donors and employment opportunities.

**e. Summary Observations**

All issues are interrelated, will exist on a defined time line, and will transfer authority from international coalition responsibility to the indigenous population. Top-level guidance from the strategic level is critical to establish an agreed framework for what is possible and to achieve the desired result. It also defines who the likely players will be and what they will contribute.

- We will need to determine costs and resources required to achieve the objectives, and this will determine what is possible.
- We need to determine who will play for accomplishing what objectives. We need buy in.
- How will the plan be implemented?
- What is the role of the planning group? When do they engage and/or participate in military planning, and how are they integrated into the coalition forces and with other member coalitions?
- Does the JIACG forward deploy to implement the plan or advise implementation, or does it remain behind? Personnel resource constraints could play a role.
- Key members of a coalition are local players who need to be involved in some way early in the planning for implementation, but it is not realistic to include them in plan design. They should be included at the earliest feasible opportunity.
- Planning cells like the JIACG would include multinational members such as coalition representatives for information distribution, and determining contributions and capabilities.
- The contribution of the UN in JIACG planning and discussions is critical yet problematic given the current USG – UN relationship. Some UN structural issues prevent UN active participation in JIACG planning. East Timor is a

unique example. It would be crisis specific, although Iraq would not because of the UNSC resolution. Without a resolution, UN, IGO, IO, and NGO participation would be *ad hoc*, not systemic.

- JIACG can contribute to military planning by informing military planners of postconflict implications of military actions, including other civilian agencies in military planning who can help war winners win the peace after conflict ends.
- JIACG assumes USG leadership and coalition multinational and multilateral partner participation, but this cannot always be assumed.
- Is JIACG an advisory or tasking body? Does it advise the combatant command commander or task agencies?
- The division of labor, responsibility, and influence between JIACG and Political Advisor (POLAD), Legal Advisor (LEGAD), Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD), etc. is not clear and could contribute to confusion and diffusion of effort.
- A fundamental problem is lack of commitment and determination at the strategic level where interagency is the driver.
- We are trying to run before we walk. Coordination within USG has not been assured, and multinational and international coordination cannot be formulated without this foundation.

### **3. Session 5 – Options for Improving Collaborative Operational Planning**

Concerning the ownership of JIACG, JFCOM's view is that ownership is undetermined. The combatant command does not *own* the JIACG and the decision on who owns the JIACG has been deferred. The JIACG must be an integral part of the planning process at the combatant command level. It needs to be a group critical to planning, otherwise it may be bypassed as unnecessary and superfluous.

Each command will structure and integrate the JIACG according to its own mission and needs. Those commands without an area of responsibility (AOR) will have differing needs, and even those with an AOR will incorporate JIACG in various ways.

#### **a. Improving Coordination Between Military and Civilian Planners**

The military is usually further along in planning during a crisis than are their civilian counterparts. Preoperation planning by the military is usually much more advanced and sophisticated than civilian counterparts, and decisions have already been made based on prior military planning. Some decisions have been made and are locked



in for years in advance due to funding and other long-term decisions. It is critical that civilians be included in the planning process early to reflect long-term planning and budgeting.

Commands do lots of other planning, including noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), theater security cooperation planning, and planning for exercises, visits, etc. They can increase civilian integration into planning for these efforts. Many USG agencies are not aware of the variety and scope of planning and work being done and this results in lots of duplication and overlap.

Plans need to be specific and tailored for specific situations. Generic plans have little value. We need country expertise to inform the planning process, and the JIACG may have to be tailored depending on the specific subject of the plan.

The JIACG needs to be higher up in the decision making process, closer to the seat of power where strategic decisions are made. Currently, it is at the operational level and has too little influence too late in the process.

**b. Hurdles Between Civilian and Military Interface**

The discussion identified a number of hurdles that must be overcome:

- Language and communication between military and civilian communities.
- Each has a different culture.
- Who owns the plans once they are developed?
- Differing strengths and weaknesses.
- Different mandates.
- Access to information (security classification).
- Planning capacity and resources.
- Differing approaches and requirements for planning; the military requires an end state to do backward planning and must know where it is going. Civilians are more able to forward plan without the required end state defined. Civilians plan tactically whereas military planning is more operational.
- Budgetary constraints. Civilians operate under greater financial constraints and have budgetary issues in terms of funding operations that do not hinder military.
- Nonmilitary agencies have no contingency funding available to respond to crises or pools of resources to react to opportunities. They can only take

advantage if crises fall at opportune times during budget cycles when pools of money are available and uncommitted.

**c. Options to Overcome Disconnects Between Military and Civilians to Improve Planning**

Would JIACG contribute to improved planning and plans?

- We need a core of permanent members augmented by specific subject matter experts depending on the particular circumstance or crisis.
- Multinational participation will occur if the systems and processes for participation are built (“If you build it they will come.”). But active participation is necessary and input must have a value added to the civilian side as well as the military side. Participation will be on a case-specific basis and depend on interests and needs. Influence in the system is also critical.
- The makeup of the JIACG may well change as a crisis evolves, for example, precrisis group will be more civilian-oriented, but as crisis emerges, the military may become more prominent. Who is included and in what capacity is critical. All countries will want to be informed and involved, regardless of their level of participation. Realistically, participation depends upon contributions – what is brought to the table – and terminal observers will be weeded out.
- Nonconflict crises will have a different nature. Military commands will be less of a locus of decision. IGOs, IOs, and NGOs will take a larger role. In USG, OFDA/DART teams, and USAID will take the lead with military backup.

**d. Consider the Need for Common Operational Planning Protocols – Bridging Current Disconnects**

- The JIACG would develop its own SOPs and protocols to integrate military and civilian planning for optimal results. We will want an integrated physical communication system compatible with all input agencies; NATO could be a model. Classification levels will be complicated but can be worked out, which is much more of a problem if multinational partners are involved.
- Identifying the need for liaisons and communication capability can be accomplished through joint planning and exercises, and also provide necessary familiarity with various common and disparate capabilities and resources. The goal is to be as interoperable as possible.
- Establish common levels of contact with agencies and governments, such as an agreed-upon level of contact or entry to assure that the correct level of information is given and that it is received at the appropriate level.

- Establish common security clearance protocols to make sure everyone is on the same footing and information is shared as completely as possible.
- We need specific exercises designed to test civilian and military contributions, not just civilian add-ons to military exercises. Must have a multinational component built in from the beginning.
- Civilian agencies and NGOs do not have staffing for exercises.

#### **4. Session 6 – Future Experimentation Opportunities and Preparation of Working Group Briefing**

The working group developed the briefing for the plenary session included in Appendix E.



**APPENDIX A**

**PARTICIPANTS LIST**

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WORKSHOP**



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## **APPENDIX B**

### **READ AHEAD MATERIAL**



***IMPROVING INTERAGENCY  
COOPERATION  
IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR  
CRISIS RESPONSE***



***Joint Interagency Coordination Group  
(JIACG)  
Prototype Development***

**Joint Experimentation  
United States Joint Forces Command**

**22 September 2003**

## PREFACE

This “primer” seeks to inform a broad audience of potential military and civilian multinational and multilateral partners about U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM) efforts to strengthen multi-agency planning and coordination for crisis response.

We hope to open a useful dialogue about JFCOM’s emerging concept for improving multi-agency cooperation through a largely civilian staff directorate called the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, or “JIACG” as most call it. Currently, JFCOM is prototyping this JIACG staff directorate, and with further experimentation we plan to establish a fully functional capacity in about two years.

The ongoing war on terrorism spotlighted early on the need for military activities to be closely tied with parallel civilian efforts. Immediately recognizing this requirement in the first weeks following the attacks of 9-11, the Deputies Committee approved a Joint Staff proposal to establish a “limited capability” JIACG within each region. This proposal was based on JFCOM’s work to enhance interagency cooperation.

Experimentation continued to develop the JIACG concept for the broader challenge of crisis response. Based on favorable findings from our *Millennium Challenge 2002* experiment, the JIACG concept received approval for prototype implementation. Our model of a JIACG prototype envisions a fully capable JIACG to deal with a wide range of crisis responses including peacetime engagement, crisis prevention, crisis intervention, and stabilization operations.

Looking ahead, there are still many unanswered questions for achieving coherent operational planning among an expanded group of multinational and multilateral actors. We are seeking to find an approach that is multi-agency in nature and further extends coordination into the multinational and multilateral spheres.

As we move forward together, please appreciate that we are still in discovery of how best to strengthen cooperation among military and civilian operational planners. Your insights and experiences will enable us to find the best approach for all participating agencies and their multinational and multilateral partners.

Questions or comments should be directed to Mr. John Liles, JIACG Prototype Developer, (757-836-8060, DSN: 836-8060), [john.liles@je.jfcom.mil](mailto:john.liles@je.jfcom.mil).

// signed //  
Phillip Kearley  
Head, Interagency Prototype  
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
# IMPROVING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR CRISIS RESPONSE

## 1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to outline an approach that can bring multinational and multilateral partners together with U.S. civilian and military operational planners to coordinate preparations for a contingency operation to respond to a regional crisis. This is a very important initiative with broad implications for civilian-military planning of crisis response operations in the future.

The blueprint of this paper begins with a brief description the Joint Forces Command's concept for improving cooperation among agencies in operational planning and coordination<sup>1</sup> for crisis response. It then outlines our current prototyping approach for fielding a Joint Interagency Coordination Group, or "JIACG," in each region as a mechanism to harmonize operational planning. The paper closes with a discussion of how multinational and multilateral partners can be brought together with U.S. operational planners in a coherent planning process.

What is broken? Most seasoned practioners agree that there are critical shortcomings in integrated planning and coordination at the operational level where agency "campaign plans" are formulated, as depicted in the chart below.



<sup>1</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Directorate, (J9), *A Concept for Improving U.S. Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination*, White Paper Version 1.0, of 4 March 2002.

The reasons for these disconnects are natural—diverse cultures, competing interests, differing information needs, and specific priorities among the agencies are frequent obstacles to harmonizing agency campaign plans. These problems can lead to unnecessary policy gaps and resource disconnects at the strategic level, and they undermine the effectiveness of operations at the in-country tactical level.

Why does this shortfall exist? The primary cause is the difference in the regional structure among military and civilian agencies—these structures from Washington to the field do not match up. For example, the State Department’s campaign planning activities – diplomatic engagement, political transition and elections, public security, war crimes prosecution – are normally accomplished in Washington within a regional or functional bureau. In comparison, the Defense Department’s four regional military headquarters performs military campaign planning activities outside of Washington.

In addition to these structural complications, there are other reasons for disconnected operational planning. On the process side, for example, operational planning follows sequentially from strategic planning, but unfortunately without early notice, it may be necessary to get operational planning done under urgent timelines in which agency planners often take shortcuts and do not coordinate with other agencies far away. Moreover, with differing organizational missions, cultures and practices, civilian and military planners must overcome several unproductive habits—such as “stay in your own lane”—to successfully address the many complex multi-agency tasks which are common to today’s contingency operations.

## **2. Concept Description**

The purpose of a JIACG is to bridge the gap between civilian and military campaign planning efforts for potential crises.

The JIACG mechanism is envisioned to be a multi-functional staff advisory and planning element consisting of civilian agency crisis response experts working as part of the military’s regional command. This small multi-agency staff directorate facilitates information-sharing across the interagency community through habitual collaboration to coordinate crisis response planning at the operational level across all U.S. government agencies.


By using common information-sharing capabilities to coordinate planning efforts, the JIACG participates in the military’s planning for theater strategic engagement as well as for crisis response. The JIACG keeps the regional military command informed on civilian agency campaign planning as well as civilian agency perspectives, capabilities, and support requirements. At the same time, the JIACG informs civilian agencies of military’s operational requirements, concerns, capabilities and limitations. Operating under the right business rules for conducting operational

coordination, a JIACG's activities would not infringe on current staff responsibilities or bypass existing agency lines of authority or communications networks.

Conversely, this new staff capability would not infringe on current military staff responsibilities or abrogate any current civilian agency authorities. Accordingly, the JIACG would NOT:

- Replace any civilian agency staff officer currently assigned to the military staff such as the commander's Political Advisor, or by-pass any existing civilian agency lines of authority and communications networks
- Provide civilian agency concurrence to internal DoD staffing actions
- Interfere with existing Memoranda of Understanding and agreed-practices for requests for assistance, or most other formalized inter-agency request processes
- Challenge or replace the statutory and presidential-directed relationships for developing, implementing, or executing U.S. national security and foreign policy

As depicted in the chart below, the JIACG is a completely integrated staff directorate within a regional military headquarters. It performs important functions not accomplished today. By using habitual relationships, the JIACG coordinates operational planning efforts to harmonize military activities with those of civilian agencies which are planned in Washington and implemented by country teams located at U.S. embassies in country. This coordination also includes multinational and multilateral partners.




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The JIACG functions as the regional military command's lead proponent for civilian agency activities in preparing a crisis response at the operational level and provides

a civilian agency perspective for military operational planners. Under the direction of a senior civilian SES level or SES equivalent, the JIACG is a fully integrated participant in the military staff's planning activities. Through daily internal staff conversations coupled with discussions with operational planners in Washington, the JIACG serves as a focal point for civilian agency situational understanding and crisis response for the regional military commander. To this end, the JIACG maintains relationships, leverages technologies and employs techniques that enable a coherent assessment of all external civilian agency planning activities.

### 3. Applications of the JIACG Concept

Within the military, the JIACG interacts with the regional military planning staff on a daily basis. It draws on the military command's planning to ensure relevant and timely connections are made with related civilian agency operational planning for a specific crisis response operation. The benefit of these linkages in operational planning is harmonizing civilian agency operational planning with military planning in order to bring coherency in action on the ground—a contribution that does not exist today.



Unclassified

Organizationally, the JIACG core staff is configured to cover geographic sub-regions as well as key civilian functions in crisis planning as represented in the chart above. This is accomplished by using the construct of a matrix organization. The intent is to conduct operational planning with all military planners “around the table” in a way that leverages available “knowledge” to bypass any barriers that limit good thinking and lessons offered by non-military perspectives.

Extending into civilian agency planning by leveraging easy-to-use desktop technologies, the JIACG operates within a collaborative information environment (CIE) that virtually links military planning to the broader interagency community for real time coordination. The CIE enables operational coordination by reducing the time that planning experts have to expend to perform operational coordination and share information. There is literally a “warehouse” of available information within the CIE that allows all involved in planning for a crisis response to share 24/7 access to the same current situation information.

In periods of relative peace, the JIACG trains and exercises with potential crisis response agencies and organizations, employing standard operating procedures for operations within the regional military command’s area of responsibility. This pre-crisis interaction and training builds a foundation for a coordinated effort and reduces the time required to bring together crisis response planners when needed.

Overall, the JIACG is a very small investment that provides unique capabilities to the operational planning process through habitual relationships with civilian agencies and organizations, by its in-depth understanding of the region, and through its use of a virtual collaborative network.


#### **4. JIACG Prototyping Methodology**

Any new concept such as the JIACG needs to be fleshed out and evaluated by the process of “prototyping.” Compelling necessity, however, required JFCOM to modify normal prototyping methods by fielding the JIACG prototype in two stages. Right after the terrorist attacks of 9-11, military commanders and their civilian counterparts demanded a JIACG mechanism to resolve operational disconnects in the war against terrorism. JFCOM met this urgent requirement with a *Block I Prototype*. Versions of the Block I Prototype were fielded in 2002, and a follow-on interim evaluation enabled us to capture valuable lessons from the early deployment.

Then, as we captured lessons learned during the Block I effort, JFCOM prepared to field a *Block II Prototype* beginning in October 2003. Block II represents a fully functional capacity for crisis response, and offers an opportunity to experiment with proposals that address lessons learned from recent planning efforts.

Although initial feedback on the Block I effort was extremely positive, several areas of common concern arose from the evaluation. Primary issues include first, the need for secure connectivity with civilian agencies to get timely inputs to JIACG planning requirements; second, the need to stabilize and retain civilian personnel who become experts in bridging the gap between military and civilian agency planning; and third, the need for acceptable measures to assess the value added and effectiveness of a JIACG, particularly to support future resource requests to support implementation of this important initiative.

The JIACG prototyping methodology is designed to ensure that our conceptual improvements are tested against lessons learned from the Block I effort. It also delivers an initial blueprint for JIACG employment as well as new connections to the Collaborative Information Environment, which now extends into the Washington interagency community. JFCOM will continue parallel development of a Block II Prototype for experimentation and integrate the results of the Block I Prototype effort as depicted in the chart below.



- Block I:** Deliver JIACG blueprint and CIE connectivity.
- Block IE:** Advance concept through Regional Command prototyping, Feedback to Block II development.
- Block II:** Develop and integrate multi-lateral through CD&E, integrate results of Block I and Block I Export operations and exercises.

Unclassified

One of the major aspects of the Block II Prototype is to bring in the multinational and multilateral aspects of operational planning. Since this effort breaks new pathways into uncharted territory, a systematic approach is needed to support our experimentation of the Block II Prototype.

## 5. Experimentation in Multinational & Multilateral Planning

Most contingency operations that respond to a crisis are multinational and multilateral in composition. However, there are still many unanswered questions for achieving coherent operational planning among an expanded group of multinational and multilateral actors. We need to find an approach to operational planning and coordination that is multi-agency in nature and further extends into the multinational and multilateral spheres.

A key concept that opens the way to good thinking about this approach is to appreciate the distinction between an *intervention* and a *coalition*. When a crisis calls for international intervention, the contingency operation usually includes several coalitions. The June 1999 international intervention to secure NATO's victory in Kosovo, for example, included several coalitions to include, among others, a political coalition, a relief coalition, a military coalition, a civil administration coalition, a rule-of-law coalition and an economic reconstruction coalition. Some of these were largely multinational in composition, while others were mostly multilateral.

Coalitions do not simply come "off the shelf." Instead, they are mostly ad hoc formations—each one requires building its political and structural foundations during the planning process in order for its operations to succeed. The point is that each coalition will have its own structure, organizational leadership, group of participants, and operating parameters. And each one will have its own operational planners.

The success of an intervention requires that most of these coalitions coordinate their operational planning with one another. Therefore, our approach to extending interagency operational planning via the JIACG Block II Prototype is to examine some important civilian coalitions of an intervention, with the first two being critical:

- The relief coalition
- The rule-of-law coalition
- An institution-building coalition
- The human rights coalition
- A reconstruction & development coalition

Cooperation in operational planning among these coalitions of an intervention is further complicated by the fact that each one of these civilian coalitions has distinct characteristics. At the outset, therefore, a JIACG will have to adapt itself to the specific structure and manner of planning and coordination of each coalition involved in the contingency operation.

This fluid and complex planning environment suggests that we need a flexible framework, or a suitably generic approach, for a JIACG to promote cooperative planning among this expanded group of civilian actors. This flexible approach is key to completing a comprehensive analysis of each coalition participating in a contingency operation.

Once the comprehensive analysis of each coalition has been completed, an experiment in cooperative planning can be conducted involving selected U.S. and international participants. The emphasis of the experiment would be to confirm the results of the previous analysis of coalition planning activities and to craft an approach for the JIACG and civilian operational planners to work together, and extending this coordination into the multinational and multilateral spheres.

Experimentation results can also be applied to other JIACG Block II prototyping efforts in ongoing training and exercises sponsored by each regional military command.

The desired end state is cooperative operational planning using the JIACG as a catalyst for improvement. Although this is a complex challenge in many respects, the strategy outlined below offers the opportunity to promote mission success for all agencies.

A productive way to proceed is to build our approach based on several key issues that once clarified, could provide a basis for cooperative planning under an urgent timeline. These issues might include:

- What is the *structural configuration* for the various coalitions of an intervention? Leading entity? Participants? Key centers for planning and coordination of coalition activities?
- What is the *regional presence and footprint* of the key actors of each specific coalition? Existing peacetime presence? Where...consolidated in one major city? Surge capacity in standby mode? Key coalition actors for mobilizing regional assets and bringing in necessary capabilities from other regions?
- Which *U.S. civilian agency is responsible* for representing U.S. interests in operational planning of the coalition? Internal agency arrangements? Authorities? Office roles? Communication links to non-U.S. actors?
- How is *operational planning* accomplished for the coalition? Lead planning entity? Contributors? Planning processes? Approving authority? Distribution of plans?
- What are the *practices for information-sharing* among coalition partners? Technical systems used? Flow of information? Open or closed systems? Security classification issues? Distribution of information? Barriers to information sharing?
- What are the *substantive matters* for operational planning within the coalition? Situation assessment? Time horizon for planning operations? Major



planning factors? Operational priorities? Deployment schemes? Mission start-up procedure? Transition horizon and best practices?

- What are the *cross-agency issues for civilian and military planners in planning for operations*? Multi-agency campaign planning? Unified direction? Information sharing? Common operational guidelines? Training requirements? Milestones? Performance assessments?

Obviously, there may be other generic issues that may need inclusion in a flexible approach to cooperative planning among multinational and multilateral partners. However, for our purposes now, the questions listed above set the stage for further investigation in the near future.

## **6. The Way Ahead for Prototype Experimentation**

Never before have we attempted to craft a coherent approach to cooperative operational planning extending into the multinational and multilateral spheres. With the advent of the JIACG, however, we now have the opportunity to explore new pathways to improved cooperation.

As we pursue promising alternatives, we should appreciate that we are still in discovery of how best to strengthen cooperation among military and civilian operational planners. A sound strategy for further experimentation will enable us to find the best approach for all participating agencies.

Conclusions from this analysis suggest that a strategy for further experimentation must take into account the following parameters:

- All U.S. agencies must be willing participants in the enterprise
- Each different coalition of an intervention has to be analyzed in depth
- Operational planning efforts for each coalition have to be clarified
- The following key issues for cooperative planning have to be answered
  - What is the structural configuration for each coalition?
  - What is the regional presence and footprint of the coalition's actors?
  - Which U.S. civilian agency is responsible for operational planning?
  - How is operational planning accomplished for the coalition?
  - What are the practices for information-sharing among coalition partners?
  - What are the substantive matters for operational planning?
  - What are the key issues for planning for operations?

A strategy for proceeding with further experimentation calls for a step-wise approach taking each coalition in turn. The following civilian coalitions of an intervention should be assessed in priority, with the first two being truly critical:

- The relief coalition
- The rule of law coalition
- The institution-building coalition
- A human rights coalition
- A reconstruction & development coalition

A series of small workshops to be sponsored over the next several months by Joint Forces Command (J9) involves networking key civilian officials, such as State-PM or USAID (OFDA), to address a realistic crisis scenario. Based on lessons learned from these workshops, steps to improve operational planning can be identified.

Willing agency participation, both military and civilian, is key to completing a comprehensive analysis of each coalition listed above. Within a few months' time, the key issues can be answered in close collaboration with the appropriate international participants.

## **7. Summary**

The JIACG concept is a necessary element in effective military and civilian agency planning that will strengthen operational performance of all participants in an intervention. The JIACG concept is about transformation—it's about thinking and operating differently, using networked knowledge, using a truly collaborative approach to planning and operations, and providing a coherently interagency perspective to respond to the demanding challenges of today's operational environment.

# Glossary

## TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Coalition – An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

Crisis – An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

Experimentation - An iterative scientific approach that includes rigorous management of controls and variables to provide quantifiable, repeatable results.

Hypothesis - An unproved theory, proposition, or supposition that provides a basis for further investigation and experimentation.

Interagency community – Represents collectively the integration of all US Government departments and agencies and non-government organizations in order to develop, execute, and implement national security policy. Encompasses all elements of national power.

Intervention – An intrusion, often with force, in a foreign dispute or conflict.

Joint Interagency Coordination Group – A multi-disciplinary advisory element on the Combatant Command staff that facilitates planning and information sharing across the interagency community. The primary role of the JIACG is to bridge the gap between civilian and military operational coordination across the full-spectrum of peacetime engagement, crisis prevention, conflict intervention and transition, and post-conflict stabilization.

JIACG Block I – A capability that delivers an initial concept of operations for JIACG employment and connection to Joint Forces Command's interagency collaborative network.

JIACG Block II - A Joint Forces Command prototype effort for the period October 2003 to October 2004 that focuses on developing a fully functional capacity for crisis response and address interagency lessons learned from recent interventions, to include mechanisms for multi agency, multinational, and multilateral coordination,

Multilateral – Between two or more agencies of two or more nations, international organizations, intergovernmental organizations, or non-governmental organizations.

Multinational – Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners.

Operational-level – The level at which major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within regions or operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing objectives needed to accomplish strategic directed actions. These operational activities ensure the logistics and administrative support of tactical elements.

Operational planning – The process of identifying and synchronizing key activities (e.g. objectives) to be accomplished. The process begins with the identification of priorities and concludes with the development and distribution of an approved plan.

Prototype – A model suitable for evaluation of design, performance, and production potential.

## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation
CIE	Collaborative Information Environment
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DC	Deputies Committee
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Treasury
IA	Interagency
JFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
ML	Multilateral
MN	Multinational
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSC	National Security Council
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
POL-MIL	Political-Military
PCC	Policy Coordinating Committee
SES	Senior Executive Service
SRSG	Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

**WORKSHOP CONCEPT**  
**for**  
**IMPROVING COOPERATION IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING AMONG**  
**INTERAGENCY, MULTINATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNERS**  
**7-9 October 2003**

**I. GENERAL**

This workshop is co-sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the U.S. Department of State. It is one of several events in the experimental development of emerging concepts for improving operational planning and coordination among civilian and military organizations and agencies in responding to regional crises. This workshop is designed to bring together knowledgeable civilian and military officials who would likely be engaged through the full range of operational planning activities concerning diplomatic, economic, political, legal, humanitarian, and security efforts that typically occur in mounting an international intervention to address a complex emergency. The focus of the workshop is on finding useful options for improving operational-level planning and coordination among interagency, multinational, and multilateral actors participating in the execution of complex emergency operations.

**II. LOCATION AND DATE**

The workshop will be conducted at the Department of State Foreign Service Institute's George Schultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, 4000 Arlington Blvd., Arlington, Virginia from 7 to 9 October 2003.

**III. BACKGROUND**

Since end of the Cold War, the international environment has changed significantly, and military forces have increasingly been employed to assist in the resolution of regional crises in multinational and multilateral contexts. Significantly, practitioners recognize that the long-term solution to these crises requires a multi-dimensional, integrated approach. The term often used to describe this new operating environment is "complex" since most of these crises involve state collapse amid internal conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and organized criminal activity. The new operating environment is not only defined by the complexity of the issues to be resolved, but also by the requirement for all institutions engaged in their resolution – both state and non-state actors – to act and interact cooperatively in support of peace and security, but often with different interests, intermediate objectives and prescriptive processes. These aspects of complexity typically include the need for immediate conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance as well as longer-term development of institutions and economic capacity and have had a far-reaching impact on how governmental and non-governmental actors respond during these contingencies.

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), JFCOM has initiated an effort to transform civilian and military planning and coordination at the operational level for

these complex emergencies. In a series of experiments, JFCOM is examining possible organizational and process changes to create standing planning relationships, better information flow, improved decision-making, and more integrated action. A specific initiative, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), is designed to improve collaboration and leverage the capabilities resident in U.S. and other governments and international agencies to facilitate unity of effort. The JIACG, located at the headquarters of a military combatant command, is a small interagency team with the role to integrate military and civilian agencies at the regional level by exchanging information, providing the full range of diplomatic, economic, political, legal, humanitarian, and military expertise and analytical capabilities to harmonize operational planning among the range of civilian efforts and the military operation in an intervention.

A key part of this experimentation effort addresses how best to operate in the dynamic environment populated with multinational and multilateral partners. Coordination with these important actors, who often have comparative advantage in specific areas, is necessary because they frequently provide the capabilities that are essential to the success of the international response. To accomplish its objectives, the JFCOM experiments must replicate the real environment and integrate the capabilities of appropriate organizations responsible for planning and executing complex emergency responses. To that end, the experiments will bring together representatives from a wide array of organizations to exchange ideas and find realistic solutions to harmonize civilian and military efforts to achieve mission success.

#### **IV. THE CONTEXT OF PLANNING FOR INTERVENTIONS**

An international intervention requires several coalitions. Some of these are largely multinational in composition, while others are mostly multilateral. A military coalition, for example, is usually an *ad hoc* multinational organization because governments own military forces. Other coalitions of an intervention are considerably different, and they may include:

- A relief coalition (led by a United Nations (UN) relief organization)
- A political coalition (led by a major regional power)
- A rule of law coalition (led by the UN or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE))
- A institution-building coalition (led by the UN or OSCE)
- An electoral activities coalition (led by the UN)
- A reconstruction & development coalition (led by a major power)
- A human rights coalition (led by the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) or a War Crimes Tribunal)
- A nuclear WMD inspection coalition (led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))
- A donor coalition (led by a leading financial contributor)

It is important to appreciate that the political and structural foundations of each one of these different coalitions have to be set in place during the planning process in order for the intervention to succeed. Each coalition will have its own structure, organizational leadership, group of participants, and operating parameters.

Accordingly, a key lesson from recent interventions is that military and civilian agency planning efforts have to be extended to potential multinational and multilateral partners. Consultations with a lead nation's allies, regional partners, potential contributors, and international organizations are crucial to ensuring lead nation political-military planning wins active support and participation from other partners in each of the different coalitions called for by the intervention.

In the United States, for example, many civilian agencies of the U.S. Government such as the Departments of State and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development, participate in the operational planning of each one of these coalitions. Civilian agencies coordinate U.S. policy, non-military participation, and financial contributions to each coalition's activities. The "relief coalition" of an intervention, for instance, may be shaped by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) participating in the operational planning of a UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) relief effort implemented by a coalition of International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Similarly, in the case of a "rule-of-law" coalition, the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) works closely with the U.S. Department of Justice to carry forward U.S. interests in mounting a police operation in the intervention carried out by a coalition of nations that is often organized by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). These two examples illustrate that each coalition is very different, but each one has critical ties with the military operation.

Essentially, the key to the solution is to create a coherent approach to accomplish cooperative operational planning among the various coalitions in an intervention. It is the major role for the JIACG to facilitate the planning and implementation of the solution, acting in partnership with U.S. civilian agencies to extend cooperation to participating multinational and multilateral coalitions of an intervention.

## **V. WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES**

This workshop seeks to find opportunities for improving cooperation in operational planning for crisis intervention that involves multinational and multilateral partners working within the various coalitions to restore peace and stability in a troubled state. As a result, this workshop will inform the series of continuing organizational and operational experiments that JFCOM will conduct over the next year to refine the JIACG concept and implementation. While recent international interventions such as in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Congo, or Iraq provide lessons for this analysis, an approach for improving cooperation among military and civilian operational planners should be applicable to other interagency planning efforts across the full spectrum of

global security activities ranging from conducting peacetime engagement, countering terrorism, making war, or implementing peace.

The U.S. military, through the newly formed JIACG situated at the Regional Combatant Commands, will posture itself to extend effective linkages to civilian agency officials who prepare operational plans for an intervention. In an environment where potential coalition partners have limited resources and where their internal procedures are pre-established, the JIACG should adapt itself in appropriate ways in order to operate effectively with the many different civilian coalitions of an international crisis response.

While Joint Forces Command's long-term experimentation effort will attempt to capture the transition activities from the pre-crisis period through the post-crisis restoration and reconstitution periods, this workshop will be more closely focused on deriving mechanisms, processes and relationships for improving cooperation in operational planning among multinational and multilateral partners within an intervention. The workshop results are intended to clarify the role and composition of the JIACG to support complex emergencies, the architecture of a Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) that might be established, and the type of information that will be needed to support such collaboration and coordination.

Drawing on participant expertise the workshop will:

- Introduce the participants to the JIACG concept, the CIE, and the planned experimentation program
- Share knowledge about how participant organizations conduct operational planning and coordination of their activities in these interventions
- Examine how key civilian coalitions, both multinational and multilateral, organize themselves and conduct operational planning for operations
- Clarify substantive matters for pre-crisis operational planning of civilian and military activities
- Examine information-sharing practices for operational planning and coordination of operations
- Develop options for improving collaboration for operational planning and coordination among military and civilian coalitions within an intervention
- Solicit organizational involvement in subsequent experimentation events.

## **VI. AGENDA**

The workshop will include plenary sessions with selected briefings and working group breakout sessions conducted over a three-day period. Former U.S. civilian officials with senior leadership and management experience will serve as Working Group Leaders, and each session will have detailed intermediate objectives and deliverables.



Participants should come prepared to discuss national or organizational processes used to conduct operational planning and coordination for complex emergency responses from the various organizational and functional perspectives. The detailed schedule of activities is outlined in the agenda.

## VII. PLANNING SCENARIOS

The working group sessions designed to address unique multinational and multilateral collaboration and coordination for complex emergencies. The scenario framework is:

Working Group	Scenario	Intervention	Authority	Civilian Task	Civilian Coalition
1	Terrorist chem/bio attack on major city in West Pacific	Disaster Relief and Consequence Management	Host Nation with UNSC Endorsement	Plan for the relief effort in a consequence management context	Disaster Relief Coalition; IGO lead of coalition
2	Caucasus state repressive regime, ethnic conflict	Post-war Provisional Authority and Military Occupation	NATO and UNSC	Plan for policing and rule of law in the initial post-war phase	Rule of Law Coalition; UN lead of coalition
3	West African state collapse amidst civil war	Peace implementation with a UN Transitional Authority and <i>ad hoc</i> MNF	UNSC	Plan for interim civil administration and institution building effort including/security sector	Civil administration and institution building coalition; UN-led coalition

## **VIII. PARTICIPANTS** [60 participants, 5 observers, and 10 support staff]

Participants will include representatives from the U.S. interagency community, selected partner nations, and inter-governmental and international organizations. Participants should be experienced in dealing with complex emergencies and capable of representing their organizations' interests and capabilities. Five observers are also invited to meet the participants, hear the discussions, and share the results of the workshop with their organizations.

### **A. U.S. Government Participants** [36]

- National Security Council [3]
- DoS (PM-3, INL-3, PRM-1, EAP-1, SA-1, AF-1, IO-1, PD-1, HIU-1) [13]
- USAID (OFDA-1, OTI-2, and ANE-2, AF-1) [6]
- Department of Justice (Executive for National Security-1, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program-1) [2]
- DoD [OASD (SO/LIC)-3, USD (P)-2, PA&E-1; Joint Staff J3-1, J5-1, J7-1; U.S. Joint Forces Command J9-3; and [JFCOM/J9, NDU, and IDA]<sup>1</sup> [12]

### **B. Selected Allied Nations** [15 based on 3 per country]

- Australia (DoD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), AusAID, and DoJ equivalent)
- Canada (MoD, MFA, CIDA, and DoJ equivalent)
- France (MoD, MFA, AID equivalent, and DoJ equivalent)
- Germany (MoD, MFA, AID equivalent, and DoJ equivalent)
- United Kingdom (MoD, MFA, DfID, and DoJ equivalent)

### **C. Selected Inter-Governmental and International Organizations** [9]

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [1]
- United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) [2]
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) [1]
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [2]
- The World Food Programme (WFP) [1]
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) [1]
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization [1]

### **D. Observers** [5]

- Washington Liaison Officers (CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM) [3]
- U.S. Institute of Peace [1]
- ABCA Washington Liaison Office [1]

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<sup>1</sup> A facilitating staff [JFCOM (3), IDA (4) and NDU (3)] will serve as recorders, and provide administrative and computer support (briefing slides) for the working groups and are not counted in the totals.

Annex \_\_\_\_  
**WORKSHOP SCENARIOS**

**WORKING GROUP 1**

**1. Region:** Southeast Asia/Western Pacific

**2. Situation:** National counter-terrorist intelligence sources of several nations in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific have uncovered a potential terrorist plot to mount a devastating chemical / biological attack within the next 30 days on a major city in the region—the most likely target is Manila (Philippines), although Jakarta (Indonesia) or Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) are also possible alternatives. Manila is scheduled to host a large one-week CT conference in 28 days consisting of the majority of ASEAN states along with other governments including France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Intelligence indicates the motive for this terrorist attack is revenge against governments that have taken aggressive action against groups aligned with *al Qaeda*. The precise nature of the terrorist attack is murky but a likely scenario could be a truck-mounted dispersal of chemical and bio agents throughout the city and its environs.

Due to the complexity of such a disaster, the Government of Philippines has quietly requested urgent multinational and multilateral assistance not only to prevent the terrorist attack, but also to conduct a large-scale disaster mitigation, relief and consequence management operation by international actors. In addition, ASEAN Foreign Ministers have jointly requested formal UN and member state preparations to deal with this potential attack. Upon receipt of the Foreign Ministers' request, the President of the UN Security Council issued a confidential letter to the UN Secretary General, ASEAN heads of state, and heads of all major UN relief agencies notifying them of the Council's informal consensus that should such an attack occur, the UNSC will endorse an international civil-military intervention to deal with the emergency. The letter requested capable member states and UN agencies to begin planning and preparations immediately.

**3. International Response:** For planning purposes, the anticipated international response would be formally requested by the host nation, the Philippines in this case, and it would have UNSC endorsement. The scope of the international response would entail counter-terrorist, consequence management, and disaster relief activities coordinated by the host nation. The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has quietly begun military operational planning and designated a Joint Task Force to support an international disaster relief / consequence management operation should this crisis occur as warned by the intelligence community within the next 30 days.

**4. Workshop Intent:** Focus on the civilian relief coalition's operational planning and coordination. Seek to improve harmonization of operational planning between the military support coalition and the civilian relief coalition. The group's tasks are outlined in the workshop agenda.

## WORKING GROUP 2

### 1. Region: The Caucasus

**2. Situation:** Three years ago, a repressive extremist regime with strong terrorist connections took control of an oil-rich state in the Caucasus. Immediately after covertly seizing control of the government through a “freedom festival,” the extremist regime undertook efforts to repress the country’s minority Armenian population, forcibly deport its small ethnic Russian community and provide clandestine support to *al Qaeda* operatives seeking to conduct attacks against Turkey’s western-leaning government. In reaction to European diplomatic efforts to end its rogue practices, the extremist regime cut off the supply of its oil to European states, hitting southern European states particularly hard. Within the last few months, in response to an internal Armenian resistance movement, intelligence indicates that the extremist regime is now making preparations for the massive slaughter of Armenians amounting to genocide.

Given this urgent threat to European security along its borders, NATO members and its partners have agreed to make military preparations for a humanitarian intervention and a subsequent regime change should the extremist government reject NATO’s ultimatum to stop the repression, end its support of al Qaeda, and open normal trade with European states. The UN Security Council has also passed a resolution condemning the extremist regime for “crimes against humanity” and encouraging member states to consider “using all necessary means” to prevent further atrocities. The extremist regime has rejected NATO’s ultimatum and UN diplomatic efforts, and now there are credible warning signals that a massive genocide is about to begin.

**3. International Response:** The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has authorized a NATO-sponsored military campaign to stop the genocide and remove the repressive regime from power. A military operation of 80,000 troops is to be led by Italy with major contributions provided by France, UK, Germany, the United States and partner nations in the Caucasus. The United States European Command (USEUCOM) will provide one armored division of some 20,000 troops to the NATO operation.

Anticipating a large scale post-war reconstruction effort lasting some two years, the UN Security Council directed the UN Secretary General to make immediate preparations for a post-war UN-led International Provisional Authority (UNIPA) to lead the international civilian effort in which OSCE, the EU and the Arab League would assist in providing essential civilian capacity that would include relief, civil administration, rule of law, and economic development. NATO would lead the international military effort to impose stability with the force commander provided by the United Kingdom. NATO’s military occupation would support the Provisional Authority as genuine partners.

**4. Workshop Intent:** Focus on the civilian rule of law coalition’s operational planning and coordination. Seek to improve harmonization of operational planning and coordination between the military occupation coalition and the civilian rule of law coalition. The group’s tasks are outlined in the workshop agenda.

### WORKING GROUP 3

**1. Region:** Sub-Saharan Africa

**2. Situation:** Violent internal conflict in a failed state of West Africa with historical links to the United States has brought an end to the country's rogue regime while young soldiers of various armed factions to the conflict roam the countryside. The situation on the ground includes no government civil administration anywhere in the country, rivalries among armed groups and child soldiers, large humanitarian crises with the lack of food, potable water, rampant diseases with little to no medical assistance, and a significant threat to foreign relief personnel. All the major factions to the conflict have met in Ghana to agree upon a settlement that outlines of process for political stability and peace, and the ECOWAS, the United Nations and the United States are making preparations to implement the peace in this war torn country.

**3. International Response:** The Security Council has accepted a U.S. request to lead a "green helmet" multinational force of 9,000 troops consisting of U.S., European and West African contingents to restore military stability to the country and conduct a demobilization of armed factions under a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. The United States European Command (USEUCOM) will lead the military component of the mission.

In the same resolution authorizing the U.S.-led MNF, the Council established a UN Transitional Authority to provide interim governance for a three-year period until effective government capacity can function without international supervision. The UN mission is expected to provide interim civil administration while new institutions of governance, including the security sector, are constructed to bring effective governance to the country after years of civil war. The green-helmet MNF will work closely with the UN Transitional Authority in a genuine partnership to ensure effective and timely implementation of the settlement.

**4. Workshop Intent:** Focus on the civilian coalition operational planning that provides civil administration and builds institutions (including the security sector). Seek to improve harmonization of operational planning and coordination between the *ad hoc* military peace implementation coalition and the civilian civil administration coalition.



**Annex \_\_ Workshop Agenda**  
**Interagency, Multinational, and Multilateral Workshop**  
**US Department of State and US Joint Forces Command**  
**US Department of State Foreign Service Institute**  
**7-9 October 2003**

**Day 1, 7 October 2003 (0800 to 1700)**

**0800-0830** Arrival, registration, and refreshments

**0830-0945 Plenary Session (Auditorium): Purpose—Introduce the Workshop and the Experimentation Process for Improved Collaboration in Operational Planning**

0830-0845	Welcome and administrative remarks (Chairman and Co-Sponsors)
0845-0915	Introduction to the JIACG and CIE experimentation process (Director of Interagency Experimentation, Joint Forces Command)
0915-0945	Introduction to operational planning for international interventions and the key issues to be addressed during the breakout sessions (Chairman)

**0945-1145 Plenary Session (Auditorium): Purpose—Review Participant Organization Pre-Crisis Operational Planning Processes**

0945-1000	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
1000-1015	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
1015-1030	Break (Auditorium)
1030-1045	World Food Programme
1045-1100	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
1100-1115	UN Development Program
1115-1130	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
1130-1145	International Committee of the Red Cross

**1145-1245 Lunch** (Set up outside Auditorium)

**1245-1445 Working Group Breakout Session #1 (Grp 1 in Aud.; Grp 2 in C-4109; Grp 3 in C-4111): Purpose—Introduce Group Members and Clarify the Group's Crisis Scenario**

Task One: Introduce members of Breakout Group, Leader and Support Staff. Each participant is invited to articulate one salient issue for subsequent discussion.

Task Two: Outline the tasks for succeeding sessions, the time budget for discussions and the end products desired.

Task Three: Review the group's scenario (Group 1 is SE Asia, Terrorist Attack and Consequence Management (Relief Planning); Group 2 is Caucasus State Post-War Reconstruction (Policing & Rule of Law Planning); Group 3 is Sub-Saharan Africa Failed State (Civil Administration & Institution-building Planning).

Task Four: Seek and discuss issues regarding the plenary session presentations as they pertain to the Group's tasks and the scenario.

1445-1515 Break (Coffee outside Breakout Rooms)

**1515-1700 Working Group Breakout Session #2 (Room Assignments Same):**

**Purpose—Examine the Civilian Coalition's Organizational Configuration and its Pre-Crisis Operational Planning Context**

Task One: For the given scenario, describe the organizational makeup of the civilian coalition involved in the international intervention. Outline the coalition's structural parameters (both multinational and multilateral) and identify potential partners that could be brought together in this situation. Who are the key leaders and special participants in the civilian coalition? What is the regional presence or footprint of these key civilian actors? Consider the host nation, member states and their appropriate agencies, inter-governmental organizations, international organizations, non-governmental and private volunteer organizations, and commercial enterprises.

Task Two: For the given scenario, clarify how operational planning is accomplished by the civilian coalition. Who are the key leaders and participants in operational planning for the coalition's activities? What pre-existing arrangements are used to conduct operational planning? What practices are implemented to conduct operational planning to meet mission requirements on the ground? Taking a national view, what are the relevant agencies and offices within governments, including the U.S., that act as interlocutors with multilateral planning centers? Where do key centers of operational planning and coordination exist that focus the operational planning effort (New York, Washington, Geneva, local, etc.)? How are operational plans for the civilian coalition prepared, agreed to, approved and disseminated?

**1700-1830 Social gathering in the FSI Cafeteria**

**Day 2, 8 October 2003 (0800 to 1700): Working Group Sessions All Day in Breakout Rooms**

**0800-0830 Arrival and Refreshments (Outside Working Group Rooms)**



**0830-1000 Working Group Breakout Session #3 (Grp 1 in Aud; Grp 2 in E-2120; Grp 3 in C-4111): Purpose—Examine Substantive Matters for Pre-crisis Operational Planning**

Task One: Given the group's scenario, clarify the recurring substantive issues that must be addressed by the civilian coalition's operational planners. Focus on the recurring operational planning priorities, operational situation assessment, the time horizon for operational planning activities, operational planning factors, etc.

Task Two: Clarify the cross-functional substantive issues that must be addressed by operational planners of the military coalition and the civilian coalition to achieve unity of effort. Focus on common operational planning issues that arise between the military and civilian effort.

1000-1015 Break (Coffee outside Breakout Rooms)

**1015-1200 Working Group Breakout Session #4 (Room Assignments Same): Purpose—Examine Information-sharing Practices for Operational Planning and Coordination of Operations**

Task One: Describe current information-sharing practices within the civilian members of the coalition to conduct pre-crisis operational planning and coordination for the civilian coalition's activities. What mechanisms and protocols are used to share information for operational planning and coordination between the civilian members of the coalition that involves the host nation, government civilian offices, international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations? What communication methods and means are usually established to conduct pre-crisis operational planning and coordination? What is the process for information sharing across the coalition and for what purpose? What is considered sensitive information within the coalition, and how do the coalition's operational planning entities overcome issues of sharing sensitive information?

Task Two: Discuss how information sharing is conducted between the civilian and the military members of the coalition for pre-crisis operational planning. What mechanisms and procedures can be used to enhance information sharing between the military and civilian members? What obstacles have to be overcome? How could information sharing at the operational level be enhanced between the civilian and the military members of the coalition?

1200-1300 Lunch (Cafeteria)

**1300-1500 Working Group Breakout Session #5 (Room Assignments Same): Purpose—Develop Options for Improving Collaboration for Operational Planning Between the Military and Civilian Coalition of an Intervention**

Task One: Clarify the key operational planning hurdles that need to be overcome to improve collaboration between the military and civilian operational planners participating in the intervention.

Task Two: Identify and develop options for further experimentation to overcome disconnects in operational planning and improve cross-coalition coordination that could be implemented by civilian and military planners in preparing for crisis response operations. Consider how an interagency planning staff/cell might contribute to improving operational planning between the military and civilian planners from multinational and multilateral entities. Consider the need for common operational planning protocols, guidelines, communications links, habitual relationships, exercises, and other ideas for bridging current disconnects in cross-coalition operational planning efforts.

1500-1515 Break (Coffee outside Breakout Rooms)

**1515-1700 Working Group Breakout Session #6 (Room Assignments Same):  
Purpose—Prepare Working Group Report for Presentation**

Task One: Prepare a concise 20 to 30 minute briefing for the Plenary Session in the following recommended format. Allocate a major portion of the briefing to point number five below:

1. Overview of the civilian coalition's operational planning structures, lead agencies and planning processes
2. Priority substantive issues that civilian and military coalition operational planners have to resolve in planning response activities
3. Key information-sharing requirements and practices.
4. Important disconnects and hurdles in collaboration on operational planning between the military and civilian coalition.
5. Possible options to improve cooperation in operational planning among multinational and multilateral coalitions.

Task Two: Be prepared to participate in a 30-min Plenary Session discussion of the Group's briefing.

**Day 3, 9 October 2003 (0830 to 1215) Plenary Session (Auditorium): Purpose—  
Assimilate Breakout Group Results**

0800-0830	Arrival and Refreshments
0830-0900	Working Group 1 Presentation to Plenary

0900-0930	Plenary Session Discussion of Working Group 1 Results
0930-1000	Working Group 2 Presentation to Plenary
1000-1030	Plenary Session Discussion of Working Group 2 Results
1030-1045	Break (Coffee Outside of Auditorium)
1045-1115	Working Group 3 Presentation to Plenary
1115-1145	Plenary Session Discussion of Working Group 3 Results
1145-1215	Sponsors' Wrap-up and Way Ahead

**1215-1315 Lunch and Departure**



## **Thoughts on Improving Interagency, Multinational, and Multilateral Coordination**

By Wm. J. Olson

### **Introduction**

Interagency coordination is a much sought after objective. Most agency players recognize the need for and value of practicable coordination with other agencies and components. While such coordination is a worthwhile goal in normal circumstances, complex contingencies and crisis situations make it an imperative. What many such contingencies and crises have demonstrated, however, is that coordination is a concept often more honored in the breach than in practice. This reality has led to a corresponding effort to seek conceptual approaches that will improve the possibility of coordination, and the development of institutional practices that will implement better interagency coordination.

The creation of the whole National Security Council (NSC) structure and the Department of Defense (DoD) following World War II was one of the first major attempts to improve national-level coordination of security policy formulation and implementation. Waves of reform of the DoD since 1947, indeed, the whole emphasis on “jointness” in recent years, has grown from recognition of the need for more and better coordination among the uniformed Services. Various national security directives aimed at interagency coordination in general point up continuing awareness of the need for improvements in interoperability among all U.S. government agencies.

The growth of complex environments for U.S. international engagements and the growth of a host of multinational, international, and non-government actors have only made implementing U.S. national strategic goals more difficult, necessitating even broader coordination efforts going beyond US agencies. There is no diminution of the need for coordination, of the institutional awareness of its importance, or of efforts to effect it. One objective of the America’s National Security Strategy published in September 2002 is to transform the national security institutions to meet the 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges.

The events of 9/11 only stepped up the demand for better methodologies to enhance interagency coordination. In response to those events, the NSC directed the interagency community to pursue improvements in coordination, and the DoD directed combatant commands to establish Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) to effect that objective, but focused on the global war on terrorism. As a result, seven combatant commands have created JIACGs with varying support from other agencies. While all of these iterations share this common history, the individual efforts have evolved in very different directions. In addition, thinking about how to organize these efforts, how to harmonize them, and how to improve overall interagency coordination across the full spectrum of activities through the use of JIACGs has moved in different directions.

Because of the uncertainties on how effective interagency coordination can be achieved, a series

of experiments are planned by the Joint Forces Command to gain insights into alternative implementation options. This paper discusses many of the challenges facing the parties attempting to improve coordination using full-spectrum JIACGs, and is intended to establish a common reference point for workshop participants.

### **Limits to Coordination**

While recognizing the need for coordination, it is important to understand that there are some inherent limits to the ability to coordinate, and a number of recurring, systemic obstacles that make it difficult. Coordination is an important goal but it is an unnatural act and it is fraught with troubles that the act of coordination itself can create or make worse. In addition, any sufficiently complex system, especially one based on interactions among diverse and highly articulated organizations, will be prone to paradox and dilemma as part of its natural habitat.

**The Coordination Fallacy** – Everyone wants coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated. Whatever the value of coordination, which is generally recognized as a good thing, it means giving up some degree of autonomy to others, which also generally involves limits on what one can do unilaterally that is, coordination can reduce the efficiency of an individual agency to carry out task-specific, agency-specific objectives. Further, coordination generally engages the “lead agency” concept, which means having one agency in charge of or having some directive authority over another agency’s assets and capabilities. Together, these conflicts raise esoteric “turf” issues as well as more concrete concerns over conflicting legal authorities, mission capabilities, and career objectives. These issues remain uncoordinated or unreconciled even as coordination efforts proceed.

**Coordination Paranoia** – Many agency players hold the conviction that coordination is a cover for control. Turf is an inescapable fact of interagency life and one of the most persistent elements of that environment is the belief that one agency’s desire to coordinate is merely an effort to control another agency’s resources and agenda. In some circumstances, this means that “coordination” is an exercise in discovering the hidden agenda and in constraining what another agency can do.

**Coordination and Policy** – Coordination cannot make bad policy good. A political decision to engage in unwinnable situations or environments that are not subject to political solutions currently available cannot be made viable by interagency coordination or its lack. Poor coordination, however, is likely to mask the policy failure, making it difficult to understand where the problem lies. Indeed, it is often easier to blame trouble on coordination failures rather than to single out policy failures in politically charged environments.

**Coordination Lag Time** – Not every problem can be anticipated. Individual situations are likely to present challenges that were unexpected. It takes time to decipher the exact nature of the challenge and to then figure out what type of response is necessary and appropriate. Unfortunately, problems occur at the speed of light, analysis of problems occurs at the speed of sound, and responses occur at the speed of bureaucracy.

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**Institutional Environment** – Coordination occurs in a context that is different for each agency or player. Different agencies have different missions, decision-making cycles, organizational structures, cultures, habits and practices, incentive structures, and legal constraints and imperatives. This institutional environment limits what agencies can do, but those limits are different for different agencies and can come into play in unpredictable ways. Such issues can be significant in multilateral situations, even more complex in cases involving international players, and have the potential to become extremely tangled if one adds in non-government actors.

**Coordination versus Harmony** – While harmonization of interagency efforts is a goal, it can never be more than partially successful. If this were not so, it would not be necessary to have distinct agencies with differentiated goals and objectives. It would not be necessary to coordinate.

**Coordination Cannot Print Money** – If coordination cannot make up for bad policy, it also cannot make up for limited resources or legal authority to accomplish assigned tasks adequately. It also cannot make up for the fact that various parties necessarily involved in accomplishing goals that require coordination come with different resource capabilities and constraints that cannot be changed in a timely way.

**Coordination Asymmetry** – Coordination is not pursued for its own sake but for some other goal. Since different agencies have different missions and imperatives, their goals might not necessarily align; desired outcomes might be similarly mismatched. For example, there are many activities in which law enforcement agencies might become involved in a particular combatant command's area of responsibility (AOR) that require little if any coordination with the DoD, but the reverse is not true. Indeed, while most agencies in a given AOR can have a whole range of unilateral mission possibilities, there is virtually no mission for a combatant command that does not require coordination with others. Thus, the relative imperatives for coordination can vary dramatically over time and in specific situations.

**Routine versus Complex Coordination** – Coordination in routine circumstances does not necessarily support coordination in complex contingency or crisis situations and vice versa. The same agencies might be involved but the agency players can be very different, at levels above routine engagement. Crisis also tends to foreshorten many of the normal processes that take time to effect in routine environments.

**Coordination Doesn't** – Not everything that needs coordination in theory can be coordinated in practice. In some cases, this can be the result of irreconcilable differences in goals, as between partner nations. In such circumstances, options or efforts might have to be foregone or radically limited because the players cannot agree on a course of action. In some cases, it may be a function of too little time available to reconcile major differences between players who face a common problem: the problem moves faster than decision-making or coordination capabilities.

**Lessons Learned Seldom Are** – Lessons are more often identified than learned. There are two

inherent problems involved in lessons learned exercises. The first problem is an artifact of the analytical process. An after-action reporting effort aimed at deriving lessons learned begins with the assumption that there are problems that can be identified from which lessons can be learned. Given the systemic realities cited above, this is an assumption that is rarely disappointed. Whether the lessons learned process can, however, dissociate inherent limitations from correctable shortcomings is problematic and, in itself, is one of the inherent limitations. It is also difficult for any lessons learned effort to distinguish situationally unique shortcomings in one endeavor that are necessarily transferable to other situations. In other words, some situations may have nothing to teach. The second problem with learning lessons is that it is generally poorly understood how institutions learn lessons. We know how to teach and train individuals, but it is far harder to make the same lessons understood by the organizations that rely on such individuals. Unfortunately, people move on and the lessons and training move with them. Thus, lessons are not always incorporated as part of the institutional repertoire.

**When to Coordinate** – Different agencies have different cultures and missions, and they deal with problems in very different ways. They think about problems differently and they plan for situations differently. Some have very *ad hoc* methodologies, while some have very complex and articulated systems. This history of thinking and planning and the different ways that they are done accompany any effort in which a particular agency is subsequently called upon to coordinate with another. When, then, should coordination take place? At what phase of interagency life should the virtue of coordination be realized? At the thinking stage? At the planning stage? In the past, coordination considerations have tended to occur not at the thinking and planning stages, but in circumstances when actions among agencies must actually be carried out. This means that individuals charged with coordinating activities must deal with a range of decisions affecting their ability to coordinate. These decisions might have been made by other people in circumstances removed from the immediate situation, and responding to a very different set of priorities, incentives, and requirements. To expect agencies – not to mention international and non-government players – to coordinate much earlier in the cycle of dealing with complex contingencies makes coordination considerably more difficult to accomplish, tailor to particular situations, and sustain meaningfully over time.

**Coordination at Different Levels** – Coordination must happen at different levels, but coordination at various levels is not fungible; coordination does not necessarily translate to other levels. The combatant commands, for example, already engage in a host of coordination activities up and down the chain of command. Most of these happen daily and are fairly robust. They are, however, appropriate to the time and place that they occur and may be of no use in complex contingencies. Such events can call up coordination needs that supercede the routine ones or call into play individuals much higher up in the respective organizations who had little need to know one another before the demands of the crisis. In addition, agencies and their subcomponents do not necessarily align, and while interagency connectivity may exist it might not be lashed up at the appropriate points in ways that work, especially in non-routine environments that put sudden stresses on relationships.

It is against this background of constraints on coordination that the evolution of the JIACG concept and its role in coordination improvement must be considered.



**The Paradox of Collective Action** – If circumstances make interagency coordination difficult to achieve, then what is the incentive to coordinate at all? In most cases, the imperative to coordinate generally arises when routine efforts to deal with complex situations fail. However, the worst time to develop the necessary coordination efforts and mechanisms is in the middle of a crisis when circumstances are not very forgiving. The solution would appear to be make coordination for crisis routine. Various mechanisms for exactly this purpose exist, the NSC system being the best overt example. The dilemma is that making a process routine robs the effort of its sense of urgency, and normal practice reasserts itself.

### **Interagency, Multinational, and Multilateral Coordination is a Tough Nut to Crack**

The need for interagency or intergovernmental coordination is not new. Awareness of the need and efforts to effect better coordination are not new. The landscape is populated with studies to this effect, with laws and executive orders directing it, a variety of institutional arrangements seeking it, and a growth industry analyzing it. Failures to achieve it are biblical in their proportions. No one is opposed to interagency coordination – in principle. Everyone wants it – in principle. It's a fine idea whose time has come – in principle.

So, why don't we have it? Why do we continue to seek it? Why is effecting it so elusive and difficult? As noted earlier, part of the problem lies in the fact that not everything can be fixed, not everything can be coordinated, and that while many things are fine in principle, they are a problem in practice.

**Incentives** – Part of the problem also lies in the fact that the fine ideas and sentiments upon which coordination are founded often do not get at basic questions, as in what's in it for me? What is the incentive for coordination for the individuals involved and their agencies? In many cases, the incentives in fact are negatives one. There are a lot of reasons not to coordinate, or at least not to do so beyond a certain point.

There is a principle in geography that maintains that near things are closer than far things. Institutional rewards and incentives, and values and sentiments are near things. Coordination is a distant virtue, fine in principle but risky in practice. Coordination, in some situations, means compromise. Not just both parties giving up some of what they want separately so that they can accomplish a common purpose, but one party having to surrender an important institutional value for an immediate but temporary gain whose value is not recognized by the institution. Compromise under these circumstances is not likely to be rewarded. There are not many agencies that have a career track for individuals who make a practice of compromising away the agency's core values. Punishment will continue until morale improves – and reason is restored.

Real coordination tends to take place under the pressure of circumstance, in the face of overwhelming need and in demanding situations. It is almost always *ad hoc*. Thinking about coordination tends to take place in a more relaxed atmosphere, with time to reflect but with no imperatives that make real coordination necessary. It is almost always *post hoc*. The current

effort surrounding the JIACG concept is a case in point.

**Development Along Separate Tracks** – Although the NSC directed the current evolution of the JIACG concept after the needs arising from 9/11 became apparent, it has a longer heritage. In part it is linked to the coordination problems raised in a number of international crises since Somalia. The current situations in Afghanistan and now Iraq add piquancy to the search for coordination, having surfaced their own versions of the perennial problem. The present JIACG effort is now a three-track process, rapidly becoming four. These tracks are not necessarily complementary.

The first track is the directive to create a JIACG with a counter-terror focus at the combatant commands. The second is the standing up of JIACGs at commands having very different structures and goals. The third track is the effort to analyze interagency coordination needs through the JIACG prism. The fourth is the late effort to harmonize the different iterations of the JIACGs and relate this analysis to practice, with the interagency community in general and with the specific iterations of JIACGs at combatant commands as they evolved in response to the initial directive in particular in order to meet broad interagency as well as international coordination goals.

Common to all four tracks is the idea that the need for interagency coordination is not currently being met, and corollary to this that there is some sort of institutional solution. The first track contemplated no specific solution. The second has a number of specific responses unique to local thinking. The third is alive with ideas, not all of which are pulling in the same direction. The fourth, the effort to connect ideas to practice, is in parts unknown. As noted earlier in the discussion on disconnects, it is unclear whether there is any crosswalk between theory and practice. There is simply no imperative to settle coordination problems in the abstract. Also common to all the current efforts is the fact that the project is almost wholly a DoD conceived and driven exercise with little stakeholding by other USG interagency partners.

There is, thus, considerable diversity in the JIACG's background and make-up, but little in it that offers real-world incentives beyond the generally shared sentiment that coordination is a good thing.

**Now versus Later** – Most of the thinking concerning JIACGs as functioning bodies envisions what the organizations would do and what they should look like based on findings about shortfalls in interagency coordination. Validation of the JIACG concept is based on exercises in responses to complex contingencies or crisis. Most of the effort to establish a real-world organization, however, occurs in an environment of routine and contemplates the JIACG existing day-to-day in just such a routine environment.

What this approach does not do is to make clear just what a JIACG would do day-to-day. In the resource-constrained environment of most combatant commands and interagency players – not to mention international organizations and non-government players – it is unclear what value added a JIACG brings to daily operations that is sufficient to justify its claim on limited resources. It is unclear where the shortfalls are or how those shortfalls adversely affect the command or

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interagency players to a degree that makes heroic solutions advisable and acceptable.

This presents implementing the JIACG concept with the rainy day syndrome: if it's raining you can't fix the roof; if it isn't raining you don't need to fix the roof. The need for a JIACG is most acute in crises situations, when you don't want to have coordination problems; but implementing the concept in non-crisis environments lacks the imperative needed to make it possible.

### **Challenge to Concept Implementation**

There is also a serious disconnect between the JIACG as it has evolved in practice at the combatant commands and the JIACG concept as it has evolved through discussions, white papers, meetings, and exercises. The gap is growing, and bridging the gap is becoming more problematic.

The challenge at this point is to determine a common definition of what interagency, multinational, and multilateral coordination is. For example, are the goals of the JIACG to:

- *Manage* various interagency players and their activities in order to achieve military objectives?
- *Orchestrate* interagency activities to achieve national objectives regardless of individual agency objectives?
- *Facilitate* other multinational and multilateral partners in realizing their objectives?
- *Accomplish* all of the above?

How these questions are answered influences perspective on and perception of the effort.

**Echelon of Application** – It is also unclear at what level of engagement the JIACG is meant to coordinate. Some see it as operating at the strategic level. Some see it at the interface between operations and strategy, some at the operational level. Coordination requirements run from top to bottom. They are different at different levels in their scope, importance, immediacy, and intensity. Is the full spectrum JIACG meant to address and resolve problems at all echelons?

While the tendency has been to insert the JIACG at the combatant command level, there is an impression that this single institution will be able to address a broad range of coordination issues at multiple echelons. Peacetime engagement and security cooperation are expected, but also coordination during crisis, from counter terrorism to disaster relief, not only within the U.S. Government, but also in concert with various international players and non-governmental organizations,. This is a tall order.

### **Thoughts on Next Steps**


Despite all the obstacles to interagency, multinational, and multilateral coordination in general, and to its evolution at individual combatant commands in particular, the fact remains that coordination is necessary.

No one who has ever experienced the problems arising from complex contingencies or crises can deny this. The question is how to channel that experience into an effort that can meet expectations without engaging institutional sensitivities, and to identify the incentives that can operate over time to make interagency, multinational, and multilateral coordination better.

## Directions to the National Foreign Affairs Training Center

From Washington, follow Route 50 West towards Falls Church. Exit Route 50 at George Mason Drive (the next exit after Glebe Road). At the traffic light at the top of the exit ramp, turn left, passing over Route 50 then quickly turn left again at the first light onto a service road that parallels Route 50 (east). Turn right at the sign for the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. Stop at the gate, show the guard your picture ID and obtain a parking pass. Tell the guard you are a visitor attending a conference – there will not be a charge for the parking pass. Drive through the gate and park in lot P1, P2 or P3. Walk to the Visitors' Center to sign in and to receive a visitor's badge. You will need to show the guard your picture ID to obtain a badge.

*(Note: The entrance to FSI from South George Mason Drive is now blocked, but accessible until 10:00 a.m.)*



National Foreign Affairs Training Center, US Department of State Foreign Service Institute  
The Interagency, Multinational, and Multilateral Workshop, 7-9 October will be held in Bldg C. Enter through the  
Visitors Center at Building A



Hotels within a 5 mile radius in Virginia from the NFATC, FSI  
(not an exhaustive list – there are many more)

**Crowne Plaza Hotel WASHINGTON-NAT'L ARPT, VA**

1489 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202

**2.7 Miles Southeast** of Arlington (City Center) 703-416-1600

**Hilton Crystal City at Ronald Reagan National Airport**

2399 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202

**3.2 Miles South** of Arlington (City Center) 703-418-6800

**Doubletree Hotel Crystal City-National Airport**

300 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202

**2.4 Miles Southeast** of Arlington (City Center) 703-416-4100; 703-416-1152

**Embassy Suites Hotel Crystal City-National Airport**

1300 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Arlington, VA 22202

**2.4 Miles Southeast** of Arlington (City Center) 703-979-9799; 703-979-7906

**Courtyard by Marriott Crystal City**

2899 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202

**3.4 Miles South** of Arlington (City Center) 703-549-7440

**Hilton Arlington and Towers**

950 North Stafford Street, Arlington, VA 22203

**2.2 Miles Southwest** of Arlington (City Center) 877-233-9330

**Residence Inn by Marriott Pentagon City**

550 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202

**2.3 Miles Southeast** of Arlington (City Center)

**Sheraton Crystal City Hotel**

1800 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202

**2.9 Miles Southeast** of Arlington (City Center) 703-486-1111

**Comfort Inn Washington Gateway West**

6111 Arlington Blvd., Falls Church, VA 22044

**4.1 Miles Southwest** of Arlington (City Center) 703-534-9100

**Holiday Inn NATIONAL AIRPORT/CRYSTAL CITY**

2650 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202

**3.3 Miles South** of Arlington (City Center) 703-684-7200





**APPENDIX C**  
**BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARIES**



**RADM Kenneth C. Belisle, USNR**  
**Commander, Naval Reserve Readiness Command Southeast**

Rear Admiral Kenneth C. Belisle assumed command of Naval Reserve Readiness Command Southeast on September 22, 2001. His mobilization assignment is Deputy for Operations Reserve Component, U.S. European Command.

A native of Worchester, Massachusetts, Rear Admiral Belisle is a 1967 graduate of the US. Naval Academy. In 1968, he was designated a Naval Aviator and was assigned to Patrol Squadron EIGHT (VP-8) at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. During his first tour, he participated in operational deployments to NAS Bermuda; Argentina, Newfoundland; Rota Spain and the Azores, qualifying as a Patrol Plane Commander, Mission Commander, and Instructor Pilot in the P-3A Orion aircraft. In 1972, he was assigned to Patrol Squadron THIRTY (VP-30) as an Instructor Pilot.

Rear Admiral Belisle was accepted into the TAR (Training and Administration of Reserve) Program in 1974 as was assigned to NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. He subsequently transferred to VP-66 where he assumed the duties of Assistant Operations Officer. In 1978, he reported to VP-16, based in Jacksonville, Florida, where he served as NATOPS/Safety Officer, Training Officer, and Office in Charge (OIC) of the squadron's South America detachment in support of UNITAS, a major multinational exercise involving none South American nations.

After release from active duty in 1980, he affiliated with Squadron Augment Unit VP-0516 where he served as Reserve P-3C Training Program Coordinator, directing a pilot program that led to the establishment of VP Master Augment Units. In 1983, he transferred to Patrol Squadron NINE TWO (VP-92) at NAS South Weymouth, Massachusetts, where he assumed the duties of Executive Officer. In October 1984, he became the squadron's tenth Commanding Officer.

Returning to Jacksonville, he assumed command of NR Helicopter Antisubmarine Wing 0174 in August 1987. He subsequently served as Commanding Officer of NR Mobile Maintenance Facility ALFA, NAS Jacksonville 0274, VTU-7474, and NR Carrier Group 0667 at NAS Atlanta. From October 1995 to September 1997, he served as Chief of Staff, Logistics Task Force, Atlantic, CINCLANTFLT, Norfolk, Virginia.

His flag assignments have included Deputy Maritime Defense Forces Atlantic, Deputy Commander Patrol Wings Atlantic, Commander Naval Base Jacksonville and Deputy Commander Fleet Air Mediterranean/Task Force 67.

His military decorations include: Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, and the Navy Commendation Medal.

Rear Admiral Belisle is a commercial pilot employed by Northwest Airlines. He resides in Jacksonville, Florida with his wife.

ROBERT WILLIAM FARRAND  
Ambassador (Retired)

A career member of the Foreign Service of the United States with the rank of Minister-Counselor, Mr. Farrand was appointed Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu in April 1990, serving in that capacity until September 1993. The following month, Farrand became Deputy Commandant for International Affairs and senior civilian at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. In July 1995, Farrand joined the staff of the Inspector General of the Department of State as senior team leader.

In March 1997, Farrand assumed dual responsibilities as Deputy High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Supervisor of the contested city of Brcko (population 80,000). During 38 months in Brcko, he oversaw the creation of a neutral, multiethnic district and departed Bosnia in May 2000. He is now in retirement and affiliated with George Mason University in Virginia as a distinguished senior fellow and affiliate professor. In 2001, he was elected Vice President (Retirees) of the American Foreign Service Association.

Between 1987 and 1990, Farrand was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. From 1985-1987, he was Deputy Director of the Office of Foreign Service Career Counseling and Assignments (Personnel).

Farrand served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia (1983-85). Prior to that Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European and Yugoslav Affairs in the Department of State (1981-83). He was Officer-in-Charge of Bilateral Affairs in State's Office of Soviet Union Affairs (1978-90). Farrand headed the U.S. Commercial Office in Moscow, USSR (1976-1978). Before that he served as chief of the economic/commercial section at the US Embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia (1973-76); Commodities Officer in the Bureau of Economics and Business Affairs at the State Department (1970-73); and chief of the consular section at the American Embassy in Moscow, USSR (1968-70).

Farrand joined the Department of State in 1964 and spent his first consular and diplomatic tour at the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (1965-67).

Ambassador Farrand received a Bachelor's degree from Mount Saint Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland, and a Master's Degree in Economics from Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the National War College.

An officer in the U.S. Navy from 1957-1964, Farrand served three years at sea followed by three years as an instructor in economics and government at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.

Born in Watertown, New York, Farrand is married with five children.  
*Revised: January, 2003*

## **Ambassador Robert E. Gribbin**

Most recently interim counselor in Accra, Ghana, Kinshasa, Congo and Monrovia, Liberia, Ambassador Gribbin lectures on and writes about Africa for the Department of State's National Foreign Affairs Training center, universities and other organizations. He served as Chief of Mission in Mauritius, Seychelles and Comoros (June – Sep 2001). He serves annually as the Senior Advisor for Africa on the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Human Rights Commission and also functioned in that capacity on the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly (Sep – Dec 2000).

Ambassador Gribbin retired from the diplomatic service in 1999. As a career Foreign Service Officer, Mr. Gribbin was the United States Ambassador to Rwanda from late 1995 to January 1999. An African hand, he previously served nearly three years as Ambassador to the Central African Republic. Prior to that he was posed as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kampala, Uganda; Principal Officer in Mombassa, Kenya; Deputy Chief of Mission in Kigali; and Economic/Commercial Officer in Bangui. In Washington, he worked in the Offices of East African and Central African Affairs and was a Congressional Fellow on the staff of the Honorable Steven Solarz. He received superior honor awards for combating famine in the horn of African and for superb management of American affair in trouble-torn Rwanda, plus several senior pay citations.

Ambassador Gribbin served as the Senior Advisor for Africa to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations during the 47<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly in 1992. During 1991-1992 he participated the Department of State's Senior Seminar.

Ambassador Gribbin's first novel, State of Decay, an Oubangui Chronicle (available from [buybooksontheweb.com](http://buybooksontheweb.com)) was published in early 2001. He is currently writing a memoir about his service in Rwanda.

Raised in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, Mr. Gribbin earned a BA from the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee, and a MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Kenya from 1968 to 1970 where he built rural water systems. Mr. Gribbin has driven the length of Africa from the Cape of Good Hope to Tangier and the breadth from Mombassa to Douala. He is married to Connie Chapman. They have two adult sons: Matt and Mark.

April 2003

## **Leonard R. Hawley**

Mr. Hawley currently serves as the senior Interagency Advisor to the U.S. Joint Forces Command. He has held several senior level national security positions in both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the U.S. Government, as a military officer and senior civilian.

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Operations from 1999 to 2001, he participated directly in foreign policy engagement and political-military preparations for several multinational force or UN peacekeeping missions. He also served as the Principal Deputy Director, National Y2K Task Force.

He served as the Director of Multinational Affairs on the National Security Council from 1997 to 1999 where he led political-military planning activities regarding multilateral complex contingency operations and represented the White House in consultations with the UN leadership on multilateral issues.

From 1995 to 1997 he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (acting) and Director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. He directed *ad hoc* OSD Policy task forces to implement multilateral contingency responses in the Balkans, Eastern Zaire, Liberia, and the Congo. He also represented the U.S. in bilateral defense policy negotiations on UN peacekeeping capabilities with Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, India, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.

He also served with the Legislative Branch of the U.S. Government first as a Legislative Fellow in the Office of Senator Lautenberg and then as Professional Staff Member of the House Armed Services Committee from 1994 to 1995.

While serving with the military, Mr. Hawley taught post-graduate level courses on national-level decision making at the National Defense University, as a Division Chief for Strategic Plans and Program Priorities, the Joint Staff, and various command and staff positions in the United States, Europe, and as an advisor to a South Vietnamese armored cavalry squadron in combat.

**Ambassador Rose M. Likins**  
**Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs**  
**Department of State**

Ms. Rose M. Likins, of Arlington, Virginia, is a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class Counselor. She currently serves as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Political Military Bureau. She recently served as Ambassador to El Salvador from 2000 to 2003. Prior to that assignment, she was the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State. Other assignments have includes overseas postings as Deputy Chief of Mission in Sofia, Bulgaria; as a political officer in Asuncion, Paraguay; and as a consular officer in Monterrey, Mexico. Ms. Likins has also served in the State Department as Director of the Operations Center, Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary, Honduras desk officer and staff assistant in the then- Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

Ms. Likins (nee McCartney) graduated magna cum laude from Mary Washington College in Fredrickburg, Virginia with a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Affairs and Spanish. She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Mortar Board Society. Ms. Likins speaks Spanish and Bulgarian.

## William J. Olson

Dr. William J. Olson is the President and CEO of Wm. J. Olson & Associates International LTD, a diversified consultancy providing a variety of services to corporate, government, and private sector clients. He was formerly the Staff Director for the US Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. The Caucus, chaired by Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, is a formal organization of the Senate with the status of a standing committee. Dr Olson developed legislation supporting community anti-drug coalitions, federal law enforcement, National Guard counter drug funding, money laundering, the Patriot Act of 2001, and support to US Customs and the Coast Guard. Before joining the Caucus, Dr Olson was a Senior Fellow at the National Strategy Information Center, a Washington think tank. While at Center, Dr. Olson worked on projects on global ungovernability, on international organized crime, and on bank security issues. He was a consultant on national security issues and on drug policy, working with such companies as Unisys, as well as with a wide variety of government agencies and the intelligence community. He is a co-author of two NSIC studies on *International Organized Crime* and on *Ethnic and Religious Nationalism*. He is the co-author of, *The Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder*, and is co-author of *Managing Contemporary Conflict*, with a forward by Lawrence Eagleburger, an in-depth look at the policies needed to deal with a changing world threatened by terrorists, international criminals, and instability. He is the co-creator and co-editor of *Trends in Organized Crime*, an international journal that focuses on ways to disrupt criminal organization. He has worked on intelligence reform, counter terrorism, counter insurgency, and on drug control issues, completing a study for the Heritage Foundation opposing drug legalization. He was also a participant in and contributor to working groups at CSIS and the Heritage Foundation on homeland security.

Formerly, Dr Olson was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters at the Department of State. The Bureau had primary responsibility for the oversight of US international counter-narcotics policy, and managed its own programs, including of 60 aircraft, with a budget of \$150m. His duties included working on long-range planning and budgeting, program evaluation, strategic planning, intelligence liaison, law enforcement liaison, Congressional relations, and public affairs. He chaired various interagency panels to develop counter-narcotics strategies for heroin, source and transit countries, and the Andes. He co-chaired the INM-DEA oversight committee for Joint Information Collection Centers, with sites in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Before joining the State Department, he was Director and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary (acting) of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in the Department of Defense, where his office had primary oversight of LIC-related policy. Work included planning and policy development for peacekeeping operations, counter insurgency, and counter narcotics. He also participated in the development of the President's National Strategy for LIC and the Andean Strategy on drug policy. He was a participant in the Secretary of Defense's Commission on Long-Range Strategy, and the Joint Service Secretaries' Study of OSD Reorganization. Before going to OSD, Dr. Olson was senior analyst on Southwest Asia at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College.



**APPENDIX D**  
**PLENARY BRIEFS**



***Welcome***

---

**Multinational & Multilateral Workshop**

**Co-Sponsored by**

**Bureau of Political Military Affairs  
Department of State**

**&**

**U.S. Joint Forces Command  
Department of Defense**

# ***Workshop Purpose***

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**Improve military and civilian agency cooperation  
in operational planning and coordination  
for crisis response in a multinational and  
multilateral context**

# ***Workshop Goals***

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**Introduce the JIACG concept & the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)**

**Examine how key civilian coalitions, both multinational and multilateral, organize themselves and perform operational planning for crisis response operations**

**Clarify substantive matters for pre-crisis operational planning**

**Examine information-sharing practices planning**

**Brainstorm options for improving cooperation in planning**

**Solicit involvement in subsequent experimentation events**

# ***Overview on Operational Planning***

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## **Purpose**

**Improving cooperation in operational planning  
for crisis response among  
multinational & multilateral partners**

# ***The Problem***

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- Operational planning for crisis response among military and civilian agencies is disconnected:
  - structural differences among agencies
  - competing bureaucratic interests
  - differences in what planning is all about
  - information sharing practices
  - time pressures
  - lack of understanding of planning by other agencies
- We lack a coherent approach to operational planning that is multi-agency in nature and further extends operational planning and coordination to multinational and multilateral partners

# *Three Levels of Planning*

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**Political-Military Planning:** Nature of threat to peace and security? Purpose and mission? Sponsor? Desired outcome? Strategic concept? Consensus? Level of involvement? Lead nation or organization? Contributions and commitments?

**Operational Planning or Campaign Planning:** Strategic imperatives? Initial objectives? Subsequent objectives? Forces and Resources? Staging bases? Pre-training? Sequencing? Deployment? Sustainment? Rotation?

**Tactical or Mission Planning:** Employment? Tempo? Direction and Control? Unit Missions? Priorities of Effort? Coordination? Reconstitution? Next Mission?



# ***Crisis Response Tasks***

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- ï **Diplomatic collaboration / Military coalition**
- ï **Cease-fire / Disengagement / Stabilization**
- ï **Prisoner exchange**
- ï **Weapons control / Demobilization**
- ï **Demining**
- ï **Humanitarian relief**
- ï **Refugee / Displaced person return**
- ï **Internal political cooperation**
- ï **Counter-terrorism**
- ï **Anti-official corruption / Illicit criminal operations**
- ï **Spoiler management**
- ï **Political Transition / Elections / Democratization**
- ï **Rule of Law / Police / Criminal justice**
- ï **Atrocities / Abuses / War crimes prosecution**
- ï **Civil and social order**
- ï **National reconciliation**
- ï **Economic reform & restoration / Private investment**
- ï **Public Diplomacy**
- ï **Flash point management**

# ***Thinking about Intervention Planning***

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- ï ***An intervention*** requires several ***coalitions***:
  - a political coalition (led by France)
  - a relief coalition (UNHCR)
  - a military coalition (UK under NATO)
  - a rule of law coalition (UN)
  - an institution building coalition (OSCE)
  - a economic reconstruction coalition (EU)
  - a donor coalition (World Bank)
- ï Some coalitions are largely multinational while others are mostly multilateral. Some are mixed.
- ï The political and structural foundations of each coalition have to be set in place. Each coalition will have its own structure, leadership, participants, operating parameters, and planning capacity.
- ï Operational planning and diplomacy go hand-in-hand. Gaining consensus among coalition partners is key.

# ***An Approach to Improved Cooperation***

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- ï Determine what coalitions are part of the intervention
- ï Clarify which civilian agency represents the government in the coalition's planning efforts
- ï Collaborate on how a specific coalition is structured, lead, planned, organized, deployed, etc.
  - *Structural configuration of the coalition?*
  - *Regional presence and footprint of the key actors?*
  - *Gov't agency responsible for planning?*
  - *Operational planning is accomplished by whom?*
  - *Practices for information-sharing among coalition partners?*
  - *Substantive matters for operational planning?*
  - *Cross-agency issues for civilian and military planners?*

# ***Workshop Design***

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**Group One: A Consequence Management Coalition supported by  
an ad hoc Military Support Coalition**

**Group Two: A Rule of Law Coalition working side-by-side with  
a NATO Military Coalition**

**Group Three: A UN Institution-building / Provisional Civil  
Administration Coalition working side-by-side  
with a 'green-helmet' Multinational Force**


# ***JFCOM JIACG Prototype***

**Mr. Phil Kearley  
USJFCOM, J9  
7 Oct 03**

**Unclassified**

# Operational-level Interagency Planning & Coordination

*Harmonizes  
operational  
planning*




# ***Concept for Operational-level Improvements***

**(JFCOM White Paper March 2002)**

- **Establish a JIACG directorate in each RCC**
- **Build a collaborative information environment**
- **Conduct planning exercises in potential crises**
- **Host regular Regional Roundtable meetings**
- **Field improved planning tools for multi-agency tasks**
- **Apply lessons learned on best practices in operational level planning and coordination**
- **Expand the scope of Annex V for deliberate plans**

# JIACG Prototype Methodology



Block I CT: Deliver JIACG blueprint and CIE connectivity to CCs; continue refinement and exploration, feedback to Block II development


Block I Exp: Advance concept through CC prototyping, feedback to Block II

Block II: Map multi-national & multi-lateral coordination through experimentation, integrate results of Block I and Block I Export




# Milestones For Prototyping

## JIACG Prototype



# JIACG Virtual Collaboration via IWSI



# Questions

# Backup

# ***Persistent Hurdles & Realistic Concerns***

- **Rivalries & tensions among agencies**
- **Differences in agency roles, priorities & footprints**
- **Diversions by current stovepipes and half-measures**
- **Tight resource pressures with declining trends**
- **Unrecognized benefits vs. recognized costs**
- **Hesitant and unclear buy-in to a common solution**
- **Inadequate incentives in peacetime until its too late**
- **Worries about ceding agency control (\$)**

# ***Strategy for Moving Ahead with Concept Implementation***

- 1. Get buy-in to co-evolution of military and interagency transformation**
- 2. Nurture agency cooperation via regular engagement**
- 3. Win NSC top cover & PCC support**
- 4. Press ahead with fielding JIACGs in RCCs**
- 5. Constitute a senior-level advisory roundtable to meet  
    `customer` needs**
- 6. Extend the CIE into the interagency & use routinely**
- 7. Craft specific gameplans for each region (agency  
    regional bureaus and the RCCs)**
- 8. Participate in embedding `best practices` thru active  
    experimentation, exercises and real contingencies**
- 9. Foster Congressional support for JIACG development  
    and implementation**

# *JFCOM's Interagency Engagement*

## **Audience**

- State (Pol-Mil, Political Affairs)
- USAID (Administrator, OFDA)
- Justice (Deputy Attorney General's Office)
- Treasury (International Affairs)
- Commerce (Executive Secretariat)
- DHS (TBD)
- NSC (Policy and Arms Control)
- Energy (International Affairs)
- Agriculture (TBD)
- Health and Human Services (TBD)

## **Agency Benefits**

- Co-evolve operating concept
- Works as partners in learning
- Enhance unity of effort
- Strengthen civil-military planning
- Advance interagency processes
- Gain access to concept development and experimentation resources

## **Approach**

- Partner with Joint Staff and OSD
- Establish personal relationship with key officials
- Co-sponsor senior-level advisory group
- Host an annual seminar to discuss strategic guidance for war game scenarios
- Encourage participation in after action reviews

## **Message**

- Review JFCOM and J9 military transformation mission
- Stress interagency equities
- Highlight past interagency participation and successes
- Explain relevant concepts
- Discuss concept development for future military/interagency operations

# ***Joint Staff and OSD Roles***

## **Joint Staff & OSD Support Envisioned:**


- **Endorse JFCOM prototyping and concept development efforts**
- **Work as partners to build internal Pentagon and interagency cooperation**
- **Help win NSC top cover & PCC support**
- **Sponsor the senior-level advisory roundtable for concept development and prototype implementation**
- **Promote regular use of the CIE**
- **Participate in events & exercises as normal JS and OSD actors**
- **Help craft and implement specific gameplans for each region**
- **Assist in developing DOTMLPF recommendations**





*United Nations  
Office for the Coordination of  
Humanitarian Affairs  
(OCHA)*

*Chuck Royce  
Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU)*





# *United Nations System*

**International  
Court of  
Justice**

**General  
Assembly**


**Economic  
and Social  
Council**

**Security  
Council**

**Trusteeship  
Council**

**Secretariat**

## *6 Principal Organs of the United Nations*





## Secretariat

**OSG**  
Office for the Secretary General

**OIOS**  
Office of Internal Oversight Services

**OLA**  
Office of Legal Affairs

**DPA**  
Department of Political Affairs

**DDA**  
Department for Disarmament Affairs

**DPKO**  
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

**OCHA**  
Office for the Coordination of  
Humanitarian Affairs

**DESA**  
Department of Economic and Social  
Affairs

**DGAACS**  
Department of General Assembly Affairs  
and Conference Services

**DPI**  
Department of Public Information


**DM**  
Department of Management

**UNSECOORD**  
Office for the United Nations Security  
Coordinator

**UNOG**  
United Nations Office at Geneva

**UNOV**  
United Nations Office at Vienna

**UNON**  
United Nations Office at Nairobi






# ***The Mission Statement:***

**OCHA's mission is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in**


**order to:**

- *Alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies;*
- *Advocate for the rights of people in need;*
- *Promote preparedness and prevention;*
- *Facilitate sustainable solutions.*





# OCHA Organigramme



NEW YORK



GENEVA




*Emergency Services Branch / OCHA Geneva*



# RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

## OCHA Tools





# Regional Desks


👁 The Regional Desks are the core of the response system.

👁 The primary function of RCB Regional Desks is the management of OCHA's Emergency Response System





# Regional Desks








# The Duty System

- Operational 24 hours/day,  
365 days/year
- Emergency telephone no.:


**(+41-22) 917 20 10**





# For More Information...


## • [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)





# Summary

- ii OCHA is a department in the UN Secretariat
- ii New York and Geneva presence
- ii Regional Desks are the core of the emergency response system, supported by MCDU, LTU, FCSS
- ii 24 hrs/day, 7 days/week readiness system






# THANK YOU





# Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU)



*Chuck Royce  
Office for the Coordination of  
Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva*



***Emergency Services Branch / OCHA Geneva***



# **OVERVIEW**

- ï Military and Civil Defence Unit**
- ï Civil-Military Lessons Learned Project**





## **MCDDU Mission**


- ï Established by IASC in 1995 to ensure the most efficient use of military and civil defence assets supporting humanitarian operations**
- ï Serves as focal point within the UN System for governments, international organizations, and military units for the employment of these assets**
- ï Coordinates mobilization of MCDA**





# Use of MCDA

**Need for Assistance**




**Military and Civil Defence Assets**

**International Disaster Relief**

**National Capabilities**

**Time**







# *MCDU Action Plan*


**Advancement**

**Knowledge**

**UN CMCoord  
Focal Point**

**Training**

**Exercises**





## **Advancement**

- ï OSLO Guidelines (1994)
  - ñ Natural Disasters
- ï MCDA Guidelines (2003)
  - ñ Complex Emergencies
- ï Guidelines Handbook (2004)
  - ñ Field Use
- ï Central Register
  - ñ Resources





## **Training**

- i Civil-Military Coordination Courses  
(CM Coord)**
  - ñ CM Coord Course (8 per year)**
  - ñ CM Coord Advanced Course (2 per year)**
- ii 739 Graduates**
  - ñ 1045 Certificates**
- i Resource for field deployments**
  - ñ FYROM, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, e.g.**





## **Exercises**

- ï Regional focus with significant HA scenario
  - ñ Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies
- ï Multinational
  - ñ 100 countries annually
- ï Ensure realistic civ-mil coordination (HOC)
  - ñ Joint Planning
  - ñ Info Exchanges
  - ñ Task Sharing





## **Lessons Learned**

- ï **Civil-Military Coordination Focus**
  - ñ **Actual Operations**
  - ñ **Exercises**
- ï **Developing Database**
  - ñ **Information Exchange**
- ï **Proposed Iraq Project**





## **Summary**

- ï Is THE critical interface in humanitarian/military relationships**
  - ñ Coordinates efficient and effective relief for Refugees/IDPs during complex emergencies and natural disasters**
- ï Five Professional Staff**
  - ñ 1 in Brussels for EU and NATO**
- ï Donor Funded**
  - ñ US, UK, France, Switzerland, Denmark**





# For More Information

[www.reliefweb.int/mcdls](http://www.reliefweb.int/mcdls)



*Emergency Services Branch / OCHA Geneva*



# Civil-Military Lessons Learned Project







## **Purpose**

- ii Promulgate Best Practices**
- ii Address Deficiencies**
- ii Key Input to CMCoord Process Advancement**
- ii Archive Civil-Military Coordination Lessons Observed for Rapid Retrieval**





## **Value**

- ï **Nothing Currently Exists!**
- ï **Coalition Reports are classified**
- ï **Inputs from entire Relief Community**
- ï **Identify Best Practices/Processes and Trends**
- ï **Recommendations for Improvement**
- ï **Provide Reliable Models for Coordination**
  - ñ **Joint Planning**
  - ñ **Information Exchange**
  - ñ **Task Sharing**





## **Architecture**

- ï **Secure Access: User ID and Password**
  - ñ **Relief Web or Virtual OSOCC Link**
- ï **Search by Country/Location, Type of Emergency, or Key Word Search (sectors)**



# **Database Contents**

- ï General Observations Section**
- ï Specific Topics**
- ï Publications**
- ï Reports Section**
- ï Additional Information**





## **Issues**

- ï Releasability of Information**
  - ñ Negative Comments Sensitivities**
- ï Maintaining CMCoord Focus**
- ï Preparation and Review of Contents**
- ï Database Maintenance**
- ï Iraq Mission**



## **Iraq Lessons Learned Field Mission**

- i Who: 2 Staff, 1 MCDU and 1 Consultant**
- i Why: Iraq is arguably the largest CMCoord effort in 50 years and military reports have been classified**
- i What: Survey and CMCoord Executive Course (Amman?)**
- i Where: Amman, Baghdad, Area Coordinators, Kuwait City, Qatar, plus Telephone Interviews with other Key Persons**
- i How: Personal Survey Method (Questionnaire)**
- i Scope: UN, ICRC, IFRC, GOs (USAID, DFID), Coalition (Senior Officers, HOC, HACCC, CMOC), NGOs, CMCoord Officers, National Officials, CA Conf**





## **When?**

- i Nov 03: Develop Survey, Technical Statements and Plan Itinerary**
- ii Jan 04: Mission Completion**
- iii Feb 04: Complete Data Collection**
- iv Mar 04: Compilation and Review**
- v Apr 04: Data Entry and Website Functional**



## **Expenses**

**ï Budget: \$40,000**

**ñ Staff: \$10,000**

**ñ Travel: \$10,000**

**ñ Application/Database Development: \$20,000**








# THANK YOU





# UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

*An Overview*



WFP  
6 plus 11

WFP

By

Location

Decentralization

Distributed  
Management  
Structure

In 2003, WFP


HQ – Rome

Six bureaux out posted

- ▶ ODPC –Panama City / Panama
- ▶ ODD – Dakar / Senegal
- ▶ ODK – Kampala / Uganda
- ▶ ODJ – Johannesburg / R. South Africa
- ▶ ODC – Cairo / Egypt
- ▶ ODB – Bangkok / Thailand


and one co-located in Rome (slated to close 31/12/03)

- ▶ ODR – Rome / Italy



# EMOP Requirements (1996 - 2000) by Country

WFP UNITED NATIONS World Food Programme  
Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit (OEP)





# Who are the Stand-by Partners?

- Government Agencies
- Norwegian Directorate of Civil Defence & Emergency Planning (DCDEP)
- Swiss Humanitarian Aid (SHA)
- Swedish Rescue Service Agency (SRSA)
- UK Department for International Development's Operation Team (DFID)
- Swedish Civil Aviation Administration (SCAA)
- The Russian Federation State Committee for Civil Defence and Emergencies (EMERCOM)
- Non-Government Organizations
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
- Fondation Suisse de Deminage (FSD)
- RedR Australia
- Commercial Companies
- Ericsson
- Svendborg Marine Surveyors/Danish Port Captain Fund

WFP provided Common Services


Air Service (DPKO and WFP)

FITTEST (Fast Information Technology and  
Telecommunication Emergency and Support team)

UN Humanitarian Relief Depot

UN Joint Logistics Center









**UN INTER-AGENCY FACILITY MANAGED BY THE  
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME**

**SINCE ITS OFFICIAL START IN 2002, OPERATIONS  
IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, IVORY COAST, LIBERIA**

**IN AN OPERATION, REPORTS TO THE  
HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR**

**CORE UNIT IN ROME FOR PLANNING AND  
PREPAREDNESS, REPORTS TO WFP'S OPERATION,  
TRANSPORT AND PREPAREDNESS DIVISION**





## **MAIN FUNCTIONS:**

- **LOGISTICS INFORMATION PLATFORM**
- **COORDINATING/SCHEDULING HUMANITARIAN MOVEMENTS**
- **MANAGING COMMONLY AVAILABLE TRANSPORT ASSETS WHEN REQUIRED**
- **PLATFORM FOR LOGISTICS COORDINATION WITH CIVIL AND MILITARY ENTITIES, DPKO AND RELEVANT AUTHORITIES**

## **OTHER FUNCTIONS:**

- **COORDINATE and DIRECT ROAD ASSESSMENTS**
- **COORDINATE USE OF WAREHOUSE CAPACITY WHEN REQUIRED**
- **RECOMMEND MOST EFFICIENT MODE OF TRANSPORTATION**
- **COORDINATE FACILITATION MEASURES WITH RELEVANT AUTHORITIES (CUSTOMS, AVIATION, MARITIME)**
- **COORDINATE INFLUX OF STRATEGIC HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT**

## **EXIT STRATEGY**

- ï The duration of a UNJLC intervention is short term
- ï Articulated exit strategy, upon activation
- ï Leaving place adequate inter-agency logistics co-ordination structures
- ï Encourage capacity building

## **STAFFING/ TRAINING**

- ï Logistics experts from UN Agencies involved, other humanitarian organisations, and donors will provide the staffing.
- ï Common training sessions are organised to familiarise experts with the UNJLC concept and procedures.

**APPENDIX E**

**WRAP-UP BRIEFINGS**





# Group 1 Outbrief

# Working Group #1

Consequence Management Coalition

Day 1 Oct 7

# Scenario Assumptions

- Crisis does not involve a failed state
- Objective is civil protection
- Host (affected) nation has limited crisis management capabilities
- Affected state has requested international assistance
- Threat is beyond capabilities of affected nation

# Thematic Observations

- Capacity of HN is critical
- Two basic types
- Global coordinating capability exists

# Key Issues in Crisis Response


- Level Of Planning Efforts
  - Strategic and Operational
- Organizational Capabilities
  - Which are the key entities ?
- Information Sharing
  - Procedural and technical problems
  - Issue of classified and security information
- Authorizing Mandate
  - National and international authorities

# Major Issues for Discussion


- Validated assessment of the problem
- Aims and objectives
- Harmonization and Coordination of effort among:
  - host nation
  - Other governments
  - international organizations (IO's)
  - non-governmental actors (NGO's)
- Planning, information exchange, task sharing,


# Information Sharing (IS) Issues


1. Understanding the Crisis Situation
2. Deconflicting the response(s)











# 1. Sharing Crisis Situation Information

## What's Needed

Types of Information:

- 
- 
- 

(Capability/interest related)

*What Information*  
*What Format*  
*How Shared*

IER

### Key Factors:

- Enabling agreements
- Trust – culture & language
- Technical
- Accepted practice: general/sectoral meetings

## What's Known

Can Share      Can't Share

**Relevant**      Irrelevant

# 1. Sharing Crisis Situation Information

## What's Needed

Types of Information:

- 
- 
- 

(Capability/interest related)

## What's Known

Can Share      Can't Share

Relevant      Irrelevant

$\delta$

*What Information*  
*What Format*  
*How Shared*


IER

How do you address this difference?

- Exception Mechanisms
- Complex Information Sharing

### Key Factors:

- Enabling agreements
- Trust – culture & language
- Technical
- Accepted practice: general/sectoral meetings



## 2. Sharing Planning Information: The Respondents

Step 2.1: Each respondent should declare their:

- Capabilities
- Desired HN Infrastructure Usage
- Intentions + Proposed Actions

## 2. Sharing Planning Information: The Contingency Plan

### Step 2.2: The Contingency Plan Framework:

- Crisis Prevention
- Crisis Avoidance
- Crisis Resolution:
  - Casualty Plan
  - Humanitarian Aid
  - Maintain Law & Order, Restore HNG Control
  - Physical Reconstruction



2. The Contingency Plan Matrix

Resources/Actions		Prevention								Avoidance				Casualty Plan			
Other Mil Int'l Org / Other Govt	Mil 1																
	Mil 2																
	IO/Gov 1																
	IO/Gov 2																
	IO/Gov 3																
HNG	IO/Gov 4																
	HNG 1	X							X							X	
	HNG 2	X								X							
	HNG 3		X		X						X			X			
	HNG 4			X							X			X			
		1.1 xxx	1.2 xxx	1.3 xxx	1.4 xxx	1.5 xxx	1.6 xxx	2.1 xxx	2.2 xxx	2.3 xxx	3.1 xxx	3.2 xxx	3.3 xxx	3.4 xxx			

## 2. The Contingency Plan Matrix

Resources/Actions		Prevention								Avoidance			Casualty Plan			
		1.1 xxx	1.2 xxx	1.3 xxx	1.4 xxx	1.5 xxx	1.6 xxx	2.1 xxx	2.2 xxx	2.3 xxx	3.1 xxx	3.2 xxx	3.3 xxx	3.4 xxx		
HNG	HNG 4			X					X		X	X				
	HNG 3		X		X							X				
	HNG 2	X						X								
	HNG 1	X				X							X			
Int'l Org / Other Govt	IO/Gov 4					X										
	IO/Gov 3															
	IO/Gov 2					X										
	IO/Gov 1					X										
Mil	Mil 2															
	Mil 1					X										

Task-specific coordination

# Problem Catalogue

# Challenges to Coordination

- Lack of experience
  - Use national experience or models
- Lack of clarity on who are responders
- Planning in isolation
- Lack of prior agreements
- Lack of clarity concerning point of contact (POC) for decisions and information
- Finances and resources (transportation is critical)
- Communication including language barriers
- Time taken to establish trust
- Differing agendas

# Challenges...con't

- Lack of agreed upon aims and objectives
- Response capability of affected country not known or mis-represented
- Political will or determination
- Organizational differences
- “corruption”
- Changing or mis-represented needs
- “CNN” element (positive or negative effect)

# Ways to Improve Collaboration

- Continue generic planning and exercises under International Organization auspices
- Make lessons learned available
- Strive for clear understanding of the problem
  - Break the problem down
  - Assign/divide responsibilities
  - Develop/use task lists
- Use common venue to resolve issues
- Common understanding of respondents’
  - Capabilities
  - Information requirements

Questions?

# Pre-Crisis Planning for CM Event

- Who takes the lead
  - Affected nation ? International Organization ?
  - Bilateral partner ?
- Who starts the ball rolling ? How ?
- Where do resources come from ? What can be committed pre-event ?
- What are the priority needs ?
  - Medical, environmental,
- How is the public affairs aspect managed ?
- Role of USG FEST Team

# Triggers for Pre-Crisis Planning

- Affected nation requests assistance
- Affected nation does not have capability to handle the expected (or actual) crisis
  - Event > capabilities
- What constitutes pre-crisis planning ?
  - General discussion of capabilities or
  - Detailed resources against needs



# Coordination Efforts


- Relationship between coordinator and coordinated
- Coalition organization
  - Who are the players
  - Where is the coordination achieved
  - What are the arrangements and mechanisms for information sharing
- Preliminary assessment and coordination takes place between affected government and concerned embassies
  - Considerable inter-embassy coordination and assessment mechanism already exists
  - Additional assessment resources may be requested

# Coordination Efforts



# Use of MCDA

**Need for Assistance**



**Military and Civil Defence Assets**

**International Disaster Relief**

**National Capabilities**

**Time**



# Day 1 Observations

- Trigger event must be affected nation's request for assistance
- Initial response to a request involves assessment of affected nation's capabilities to handle (respond) to the crisis
  - Ambassador may request specialized assessment teams to assist in evaluating the need(s)
- Many coordination mechanisms exist prior to any crisis and should be utilized
  - Inter embassy coordination and consultation is SOP
- Coalition of assistance providers will emerge based upon capabilities and interests

# Day 1 Observations (2)

- Past experience provides some basis for coordination and de-confliction
  - Nations, IO's and NGO's have considerable experience from past crises and generally understand respective capabilities and resources

# Working Group #1 Day 2

- Public affairs aspect of any crisis is an important issue
  - Management of the public affairs aspect can affect nature and degree of response
- Planning for crisis mitigation can be generic (supplies, transportation, facilities, processes, specialized teams, etc.) as well as situation-specific
- Most crisis responders have considerable experience in coordination from past events

# Coordination Practice

- Actual coordination practice depends on nature of event and country capability. For natural disasters:
  - OCHA has mandate to establish coordination center for crisis management, ideally co-located with HN facility; for UN agencies but available to others
  - Following the disaster mitigation, leave-behind is facility, procedures and experience in dealing with disasters
  - Many NGO's are contractors for national or international organizations; some are independent actors

# Factors Affecting Coordination

- Capability of Host (affected) Nation
- Role of UN
- External relationships (member of commonwealth, former colony, close bilateral relationship)
- Communications
  - Face to face coordination is still critical element
  - Technology (email, VTC, computer collaboration, etc.) enables wider participation
  - Tampere Agreement on comms for humanitarian RF communication



# Pre and Post Event IS

- Pre-event planning generally involves government to government and international organizations...NGO's likely not included
  - Info-sharing in this context generally easier
  - However, some NGO's want to be involved in pre-crisis planning
- Post-event planning includes greater number of actors and possibly more complicated info-sharing arrangements

# Ways to Improve Collaboration...con't

- Establish clear contacts with authority to make decisions and commit resources
-



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# ***Working Group 2 Wrap-up Presentation***

***Workshop for  
Improving Cooperation in Operational Planning Among  
Interagency, Multinational, and Multilateral Partners  
9 October 2003***



# DOS POL-MIL ISO

- **A holistic approach to the Rule of Law (ROL) issues should be developed, coordinated and implemented.**
  - ethnocentric orientations,
  - political restrictions (building jails)
  - national expectations.
- **Cull out the parts that are out of line with modern processes.**
- **There is a need for a “trigger” mechanism**



# DOS POL-MIL ISO

- Need interagency equivalent of “Goldwater Nichols”
- **Military Decision Making Process viz. Civilian Chaos Process Model**
- **DOJ overseas is generally contracted**
  - Requirements are based on assessment on the ground – analysis – coordination across interagency lines.
  - May require basing of staff in country to manage/monitor programs
  - Activities are coordinated with UN CIVPOL
  - Assessment is based on US standards/assumptions



# DOS POL-MIL ISO

- **Need to develop a set of principles**
  - Need to exercise process of interagency coordination.
- **There is a need for an umbrella international organization.**
  - All of the component parts of the problem are evaluated, assessed and the needs addressed.
  - How the local police are reintegrated into the new process
  - Police are only the investigation and apprehension arm.
  - Police and military planners coordinate the rules of engagement at the outset.
  - Goes back to the mandate that sets the conditions and parameters
  - Consideration of legal codes,
  - Planning is based on assumptions that may change
  - “Problems hit you at the speed of light, analysis at the speed of sound and solutions at the speed of bureaucracy.”



- **Neutrality is important to NGOs.**
  - A role of the military is to establish a secure environment within which the civilian specialists can operate.
  - On the ground the military can make short-term changes because they have manpower and resources. When the military leaves, there is no long-term sustainable capacity left behind.
  - DoD Prior to engagement, military should consider seconding planners to civilian organizations to afford them some organization and planning expertise. Adaptive planning process will bring civilian agencies into the planning structure throughout the reconstruction planning process.



# DOD

- Need to understand where the fiscal spigots are which turn on the money.
- Units in the field need “walking around money”
- OMB must deploy decision capable groups





# DOD

- **Information sharing can make or break an operation**
  - Over classification complicates decision-making
  - Release to others -- especially allies -- exacerbates this issue.
  - Coalition network is hard to establish and keep current.
  - Need to classify information, not systems.
  - Tagging information needs clear guidelines and enforcement mechanisms to preclude over classification.
  - Use of liaison officers can circumvent classification blockage



- Establish working relationships ahead of time on bi- and multi-lateral means to develop the trust and confidence between institutions.
- **Assessment is the first step in joint planning – to ID options available – coordination measures to integrate consensus plan.**
  - Time is important and the money numbers count also.
  - Habitual relationships that are well established will cut down the time required.
    - » Need for a common vocabulary – dictionary of tasks that are agreed upon.
  - Early exchange of LNOs with NGOs (third party interaction).
  - Role of the JIACG or subcomponent at the TF level is unclear.



# DOD

- **Initially, the military is engaged in security functions (policing/detaining) as well as multiple functions – the JIACG can help during that time but utility declines as the UN/NATO begins to engage.**
  - Make the JIACG an open tool that can go down to the tactical level – the LNOs constitute a semi-JIACG cell at that level.
  - Need for a technical collaborative communications tool training, resourcing, connectivity - capability exists but political will is lacking.



# DOD

- **The composition of the JIACG must be flexible enough to add value to the commander. JIACG must be positioned according to where they can best leverage the sum of their component parts**
  - Civilian and military ROL plans are synchronized harmonized.
  - Coordinated with the NATO force commander.
  - Military will support the implementation of what is written by the UN
    - JIACG role is to harmonize the three plans to ensure.
  - Numbers vary based on the needs as identified by the commander.
  - The interagency only goes where the action is
    - DoD has surge capacity
    - JIACG planning products will be looked upon with skepticism




- Does an « M » layer to the JIACG make sense in that scenario ?
- NO because :
  - *It's a UN operation, so the SRSG would be the coordinator of multinational interagency efforts*
  - *In the interim period when UN is not deployed, the force commander (IT), not the US division commander, would get national contributions to the interagency process.*
  - *Multinational Interagency coordination groups have a name...Embassies !!*

*Things would be different if the force commander was US.*
- However, reinforcing JIACG by national representatives with reachback capabilities is feasible/acceptable/suitable.



## Multinational views





## « Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later. »

- Political level/ Technical level of the multinational interagency problem...
- Ultimately most of the decisions to be taken at the « technical » level, have far reaching political consequences...



# Way Ahead

- **Need for strategic guidance imperative – reach back to host government to develop guidelines for operational level implementation.**
- **Need for three workshops (multilateral, international, interagency)**
- **Marketing plan to secure buy-in for interagency planning viz. a DOD oriented initiative**



# Wrap-up



- Need systematic approach to addressing failed states
- Bring in the NGOs once the experimentation process has matured.
- NGOs bring value to humanitarian tasks but not too many for ROL issues.
- NGOs can be a agent for synergy based on the mission.
- Bring in organizational design specialists to review the C4ISR of the JIACGs



# Working Group 3

# Working Group 3

- The Scenario and some points
- Observations on the JIACG
- JIACG Issues – but no answers

# The Scenario

- Scenario 3
  - Sub-Saharan Africa
  - UN Mandate, US lead Mil Intervention Force Chap VII op, UN Transition Authority
- Workshop Focus
  - Civil Administration and Institution building (including security)
  - Improve the interface between MNF and CTA
- Endstate: **A stable independent country with growth potential**
- Pillars
  - Security and stability
  - Civil administration
  - Economic development
  - Political reform

# Civilian Coalition Building: A EUCOM-JIACG Approach

- Recognising the UN as the lead agency (SRSG); build civilian coalition operational planning element
- Identify stakeholders, group sponsors/contributors, encourage lead agency approach, prioritize tasks
- Against priority tasks endorse sponsorship & develop plans:
  - Security & Stability; EUCOM transition through UN
  - Civil Administration; Lead entity (US)
  - Economic Development; Lead entities (IMF, World Bank, EU)
  - Political Reform; UNDP
- Engage host country institutions and population

# Priority Substantive Issues

- Strategic guidance
- Comprehensive/shared intelligence picture
- Interagency communications – between the MNF & CTA
- Resource – funding levels & availability
- Timelines including sequencing & transition points
- Coordinated public information programmes
- Measures of effectiveness
- Shared Logistics

# Observations on the JIACG Concept



# Challenges to the Process

- Political will & constraints
- Operational constraints
- Interagency trust
- Different planning capability & culture
- Locations of key HQs and planning elements
- Ineffective Communications
- Agency expertise – need and scarcity HV/LD
- Competing interests
- Tactical vs operational planning focus
- Funding cycles – agency constraints

# Options for Improvement of Cooperation

- Develop a team concept;
  - Use confidence building measures (CBM); seminars, exercises, joint training, exchanges
- **to achieve understanding, respect, & trust**
- Engagement; early identification of the willing, early initiation of planning
- A common language, protocols, and processes; including templates, information exchange agreements, liaison
- Develop understanding of international organisation mandates, planning processes, and constraints

# **Key Information Sharing Requirements and Practices**

- Compatible classification levels
- Interoperable communications systems and software
- Bridges for disparate organisational cultures and systems
- Common planning protocols and processes
- Understanding agency and national objectives

# Issues

# Issues for Discussion

- Ownership of the JIACG, processes, and products
- Staffing of the JIACG
- Operational Funding
- Congressional support
- NIACG at NSC



# Wrap-up

# Way Ahead

- **Assess**
  - Produce a formal report and forward to participants
- **Plan**
  - Use workshop results to plan Multi-National Experiment
- **Rehearse**
  - Jan 20-22 workshop in DC
- **Execute**
  - 9-20 Feb collaborative meetings tailored to stress Multi-National and Multi-Lateral coordination



## **APPENDIX F**

### **ACRONYMS**



## ACRONYMS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIE	Collaborative Information Environment
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CM	Consequence Management
CNN	Cable News Network
CT	Counter Terrorism
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEST	Foreign Emergency Support Team
HIU	Humanitarian Information Unit
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
HUMAD	Humanitarian Advisor
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGOs	Inter-Governmental Organizations
IO	International Organization
ITEA	Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIATF	Joint Inter Agency Task Force

JTF	Joint Task Force
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
LNO	Liaison Officer
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
MNF	Multinational Force
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NFATC	National Foreign Affairs Training Center
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PCC	Policy Coordinating Committee
PDD	Presidential Decision Directives
PKSOI	Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
POC	Point of Contact
POLAD	Political Advisor
Pol-Mil	Political-Military
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RMT	Response Management Team
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RoL	Rule of Law
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	UN Disaster Assistance Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIPA	UN-led International Provisional Authority
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USEUCOM	United States European Command

USG

U.S. Government

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction



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